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The Promise of a Cooperative and Proportional 
Discovery Process in North Carolina: House Bill 
380 and the New State Electronic Discovery 
Rules 
BRIAN C. VICK* AND NEIL C. MAGNUSON** 
INTRODUCTION 
With the passage of House Bill 380 (H.B. 380) in 2011,1 the North 
Carolina General Assembly not only adopted a basic set of rules to go-
vern the discovery of electronically-stored information (ESI) in the State 
courts, but also created a procedural framework that set the State on a 
path towards a more reasonable and efficient discovery process.  North 
Carolina has long adhered to the policy of allowing parties to conduct 
the liberal discovery2 pioneered by the federal courts under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.3  Although originally designed to promote the 
 
* Brian C. Vick is a commercial and health care litigator at Williams Mullen and a mem-
ber of the firm’s eDiscovery and Information Governance section.  He is the co-chair of 
the Technology Committee of the North Carolina Bar Association’s Litigation Section 
and a former judicial law clerk on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit and Eleventh Circuit.  The views expressed herein are solely those of the Author and 
should not be attributed to his firm or its clients. 
** Neil C. Magnuson is an intellectual property law associate at Williams Mullen, and a 
member of the firm’s eDiscovery and Information Governance and Interactive Software 
and Digital Media sections.  The views expressed herein are solely those of the Author 
and should not be attributed to his firm or its clients. 
 1. An Act to Clarify the Procedure for Discovery of Electronically Stored Informa-
tion and to Make Conforming Changes to the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, 
2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 199 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1 (2011)). 
 2. See Analog Devices, Inc. v. Michalski, 01 CVS 10614, 2006 NCBC LEXIS 16, at 
*33 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2006) (“Rule 26(b)(1) [of the North Carolina Rules of Civil 
Procedure] makes clear that liberal discovery is permitted.”). 
 3. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 585 (2007) (“[T]he ‘simplified no-
tice pleading standard’ of the Federal Rules ‘relies on liberal discovery rules and sum-
mary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmerito-
rious claims.’” (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002))); see 
also Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“‘[B]road dis-
covery is a cornerstone of the litigation process contemplated by the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.’” (quoting Jones v. Goord, No. 95 Civ. 8026 (GEL), 2002 U.S. Dist. 
1
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swift and inexpensive resolution of civil disputes by providing parties 
broad access to relevant facts,4 this policy has increasingly strained the 
litigation process as its ideal of the liberal flow of information has 
clashed with the practicalities of technological innovation in the field of 
electronic discovery (e-discovery).5 
Since the mid-1970s when a consumer market for personal com-
puters first began developing,6 the use of computers and other electronic 
devices has become a staple of modern life in the United States.  As a re-
sult, the volume of data that we as a society create and store electronical-
ly has increased—and continues to increase—exponentially over even 
relatively short periods of time.7  During one recent seven-year span, the 
amount of data maintained on computers increased nearly two hundred 
 
LEXIS 8707, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2002))); 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. 
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1202 (3d ed. 2004) (“The provisions for dis-
covery are so flexible and the provisions for pretrial procedure and summary judgment 
so effective, that attempted surprise in federal practice is aborted very easily, synthetic 
issues detected, and the gravamen of the dispute brought frankly into the open for the 
inspection of the court.”). 
 4. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1; O’Meara-Sterling v. Mitchell, 299 F.2d 401, 404 (5th Cir. 
1962) (“The spirit and purpose of the Federal Rules is to secure just, speedy and inex-
pensive determination of actions and they look to the admission of matters about which 
there is no dispute.”). 
 5. W.E. Aubuchon Co. v. Benefirst, LLC, 245 F.R.D. 38, 41 (D. Mass. 2007) (“This 
principle of liberal discovery is sorely tested when the object of the discovery is electron-
ic data.”).  See also Network Computing Servs. Corp. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 223 F.R.D. 392, 
395 (D.S.C. 2004) (“[O]ne attorney [had] suggested to [the court] at a discovery hearing 
that, including the request for electronic mail communications, a production request was 
‘likely to exceed one million pages.’” (quoting Crane v. Int’l Paper Co., C/A No. 3:02-
3352 (D.S.C. Apr. 25, 2003))). 
 6. See A History of IBM: 1975, IBM, http://www-
03.ibm.com/ibm/history/history/year_1975.html (last visited January 2, 2012) (noting 
the introduction of the “IBM 5100 Portable Computer, a 50 lb. desktop machine that put 
computer capabilities at the fingertips of engineers, analysts, statisticians, and other 
problem-solvers”); A History of Windows: Highlights from the First 25 Years, WINDOWS, 
http://windows.microsoft.com/en-US/windows/history (last visited January 2, 2012) (not-
ing that Microsoft was founded in 1975 with the vision of placing “a computer on every 
desktop and in every home”). 
 7. Data, Data Everywhere: A Special Report on Managing Information, THE 
ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 2010, at 1, 2 [hereinafter Data, Data Everywhere], available at 
http://bistro.northwestern.edu/mmueller/datadeluge.pdf (indicating that “[t]he amount 
of digital information increases tenfold every five years”). 
2
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fold—from approximately 5 exabytes (or 5 million terabytes) of data in 
2002 to 988 exabytes (or nearly 1 billion terabytes) of data in 2009.8 
Although the shift towards storage of information in electronic form 
represents nothing more than a change in the medium of storage, the in-
trinsic advantages of ESI9 outside of litigation often represent enormous 
and costly disadvantages once the discovery of ESI in litigation begins.10  
Indeed, given that the average desktop computer used by a company to-
day is capable of storing in excess of 100 million pages of documents, 
any company that becomes involved in litigation faces the possibility of 
having to collect, process, search, and review many times that volume of 
data in discovery.11  As the discovery of ESI has become a more prevalent 
feature of civil litigation, parties have begun facing exorbitant litigation 
expenses related solely to e-discovery.12 
Responding to the burdens associated with e-discovery, the Rules 
Committee of the Federal Judicial Conference (Federal Rules Commit-
 
 8. Bennett B. Borden, The Demise of Linear Review, E-DISCOVERY ALERT, (Williams 
Mullen, Richmond, VA.), Oct. 2010, at 1 [hereinafter The Demise of Linear Review], 
available at http://www.clearwellsystems.com/e-discovery-blog/wp-content/uploads/ 
2010/12/E-Discovery_10-05-2010_Linear-Review_1.pdf; see also Jason R. Baron & Ralph 
C. Losey, E-Discovery: Did You Know?, YOUTUBE (Feb. 11, 2010), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bWbJWcsPp1M&feature=player_embedded. 
 9. See George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal System 
Adapt?, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, ¶¶ 8-10 (2007) (explaining that today information can 
be exchanged, and edited faster, plus more information can be stored than in the past). 
 10. See Network Computing Servs., 223 F.R.D. at 395 (noting that a “request for elec-
tronic mail communications” could result in production in excess of “one million pag-
es”). 
 11. See George Paul, The Discovery Revolution, THE PRACTICAL LITIGATOR, May 2007, 
at 13, 15, available at http://www.lrlaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Paul_Practical 
Litigator_May07.pdf (estimating that an average corporate employee in 2005 had com-
puter technology capable of storing between 20 million and 100 million pages of infor-
mation). 
 12. See In re Aspartame Antitrust Litig., No. 2:06-CV-1732-LDD, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 118226, at *26–27 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2011) (awarding aggregate e-discovery-
related costs in excess of $500,000); Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 
No. 2:07-CV-1294, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48847, at *8–9 (W.D. Pa. May 6, 2011) (not-
ing that parties sought to recover e-discovery-related costs of nearly $400,000); Thermal 
Design, Inc. v. Guardian Bldg. Prods., No. 08-C-828, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50108, at *3 
(E.D. Wis. Apr. 20, 2011) (indicating that a party could incur nearly $2.5 million in ex-
penses for first round of e-discovery); CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, GUIDELINES FOR 
STATE TRIAL COURTS REGARDING DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONICALLY-STORED INFORMATION, at vi 
(Richard Van Duizend, Reporter) (2006) [hereinafter CONF. OF CHIEF JUSTICES], available 
at http://www.ncsconline.org/images/EDiscCCJGuidelinesFinal.pdf. (noting two promi-
nent cases in which the e-discovery costs were estimated to be $6.2 million and $9.75 
million). 
3
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tee) proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
2006 (2006 Amendments) specifically designed to address the discovery 
of ESI.13  The basic approach of these amendments was to create “a 
framework for the parties and the court to give early attention to issues 
relating to electronic discovery,”14 and to place the burden of managing 
e-discovery squarely on the litigants.15  By expanding the scope and im-
portance of the initial pre-trial conference under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 16 and the discovery scheduling conference under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f), the Rules Committee sought to foster 
greater levels of engagement and cooperation between parties on issues 
related to e-discovery.16  Combined with an expansion of principles of 
proportionality in Rule 26(b), this new focus on collaboration in discov-
ery has worked exceedingly well and has increased the efficiency of the 
discovery process in the federal courts.17 
While a number of states followed the federal judiciary in adopting 
rules specifically designed to manage e-discovery,18 North Carolina 
eschewed immediate action in favor of a more deliberative rule-making 
process that sought to benefit from the experience of other jurisdic-
tions.19  During this interim period, the State’s federal courts had access 
to the 2006 Amendments,20 but the State trial courts had to grapple with 
 
 13.  SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, at 22–23 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 COMM. REPORT], available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf. 
 14.  Id. at 26. 
 15. See id. at 27–32. 
 16. Id. at 26–28. 
 17. Emery G. Lee III & Kenneth J. Withers, Survey of United States Magistrate Judges 
on the Effectiveness of the 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 11 
SEDONA CONF. J. 201, 207 (2010) (finding that 71.4% of surveyed magistrate judges re-
ported that the 2006 amendment to Rule 26(f) was at least somewhat effective in “im-
proving the conduct of Rule 16(b) pretrial conferences,” and that 70.5% reported it “as at 
least somewhat effective in encouraging the parties to cooperate,” and finally that 61.1% 
of magistrate judges reported it as at least somewhat effective in “reduc[ing] the number 
of e-discovery disputes” the survey participants were asked to decide). 
 18.  See THOMAS Y. ALLMAN, STATE AND FEDERAL E-DISCOVERY TODAY: AN UPDATE 
AFTER THE 2006 FEDERAL AMENDMENTS, at 1–2, 56–69 (Nov. 28, 2011), available at 
http://www.fiosinc.com/lp/whitepaper/state-rulemaking/state-rulemaking.pdf (detailing 
the current status of state e-discovery rulemaking). 
 19.  NORTH CAROLINA BAR ASSOCIATION LITIGATION SECTION E-DISCOVERY COMMITTEE, 
PROPOSED AMENDED NORTH CAROLINA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: RULES 16, 26, 33, 34, 37 
AND 45, EXPLANATORY STATEMENT AND GENERAL COMMENTS: INTRODUCTION, at 1 (2010) 
[hereinafter E-DISCOVERY COMM. REPORT], available at 
http://www.ncbar.org/media/11074033/NCROCPAmendEDiscovery.pdf. 
 20. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, 45. 
4
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e-discovery using rules that either pre-dated the proliferation of ESI or 
only provided informal guidance.21  This deliberative rule-making ap-
proach eventually resulted in passage of H.B. 380, which amended and 
modernized the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure to create a gen-
erally-applicable framework for e-discovery for the State courts.22  Pat-
terned after the 2006 Amendments, H.B. 380 reflects the same approach 
to e-discovery and similarly attempts to reduce the associated burdens 
by promoting greater levels of cooperation and proportionality in the 
discovery process.23  Although the rule changes in H.B. 380 may seem 
modest when compared to other recent reform efforts in the State,24 
these amendments set the stage for a significant shift in how both courts 
and litigants approach discovery in the State. 
Using the experience of the federal courts under the 2006 Amend-
ments as a guide, this Article examines H.B. 380 and the effect it will 
have on the discovery process in the state courts.  Part I of this Article 
describes the litigation challenges created by the proliferation of ESI.  
Part II describes the history, structure and substance of the 2006 
Amendments, and discusses their impact in the areas of cooperation and 
the use of proportionality principles in the federal courts.  Part III de-
scribes the substance and structure of the rules changes encompassed by 
H.B. 380, and analyzes the effect that they will have on the discovery 
process in the State.  Part IV discusses specific procedural tools that 
practitioners and courts can use under the new e-discovery rules in 
North Carolina to manage the exchange of ESI more efficiently. 
I. THE CHALLENGES OF ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 
The advent and rapid spread of ESI25 has profoundly affected the 
civil litigation process due, in large part, to the simple truth that, in civil 
 
 21. See CONF. OF CHIEF JUSTICES, supra note 12, at vi–vii; see also Bank of Am. Corp. 
v. SR Int’l Bus. Ins. Co., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *9–10 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2006) 
(denying the electronic discovery request of a non-party as unduly burdensome after 
considering, among other things, the guidelines set forth in the CONF. OF CHIEF JUSTICES, 
supra note 12, at 1–11). 
 22. An Act to Clarify the Procedure for Discovery of Electronically Stored Informa-
tion and to Make Conforming Changes to the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, 
2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 199 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1 (2011)). 
 23. See E-DISCOVERY COMM. REPORT, supra note 19, at 1–2. 
 24. See, e.g., An Act to Reform the Laws Relating to Money Judgment Appeal Bonds, 
Bifurcation of Trials in Civil Cases, and Medical Liability, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 400 
(enacted from 2011 Senate Bill 33). 
 25. See PETER LYMAN & HAL R. VARIAN, HOW MUCH INFORMATION 2003? 1 (Univ. of 
Cal. at Berkley 2003), available at http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-
5
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discovery, volume drives cost.26  The more documents that a party must 
collect, process, search, review, and produce in response to discovery, 
the more that party will spend on the litigation and the more the oppos-
ing party will have to spend to organize, review, and manage the infor-
mation.27  Although not directly proportional, discovery costs will gen-
erally rise (or fall) in relation to the volume of information at issue.  As 
ESI has become more ubiquitous in our daily lives, the volume of such 
information at issue in civil discovery has rapidly increased, as have the 
associated costs of managing such information.28  
Prior to this proliferation of ESI, the physical aspects of storing in-
formation in paper form indirectly limited the volume of information at 
issue in any given piece of litigation and, thus, the potential costs asso-
ciated with discovery of that information.29  Much like the relationship 
between volume and cost in discovery, the cost for a company to store 
information on paper relates directly to the volume of paper required to 
store the information, although, again, the two variables do not necessar-
ily rise or fall in direct proportion to one another.  For example, a com-
pany seeking to store 500 pages of paper documents would have to allo-
 
much-info-2003/printable_report.pdf (estimating that of the 5 exabytes of new informa-
tion created by print, media, magnetic and optical storage media in 2002, up to 92% of 
this information was stored in a magnetic format, mostly in hard disk). 
 26. See Kenneth J. Withers, The Real Cost of Virtual Discovery, FED. DISCOVERY NEWS, 
Feb. 2001, at 3; see also 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 22 (“The discovery of 
electronically stored information raises markedly different issues from conventional dis-
covery of paper records.  Electronically stored information is characterized by exponen-
tially greater volume than hard-copy documents.”). 
 27. See Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 558 (W.D. 
Tenn. 2003) (“[T]he cost of restoring, de-duplicating, and designing and conducting a 
search of all 996 backup tapes reasonably could be in the range of several million [dol-
lars] . . . not includ[ing] the costs of privilege review and actual production . . . .”); JAMES 
N. DERTOUZOS, ET AL., THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: 
OPTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ix–xi (RAND Inst. for Civil Justice 2008), available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP183.html; Jocelyn Allison, Temp Attor-
neys Boon for Some, Liability for Others, LAW 360 (May 14, 2009, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.law360.com/web/articles/101669 (noting that electronic discovery has raised 
demand for lower-cost temporary attorneys due to an increase in the volume of docu-
ments and information that must be reviewed). 
 28. Henry S. Noyes, Good Cause Is Bad Medicine for the New E-Discovery Rules, 21 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 67–68 (2007) (“[E]-discovery is more time-consuming, more 
burdensome, and more costly than conventional discovery.”); see also Medtronic, 229 
F.R.D. at 557–58 (estimating that privilege review of the ESI at issue would have cost 
between $16.5 million and $70 million). 
 29. See 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 22–23; Noyes, supra note 28, at 67–
68. 
6
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cate the physical volume of space that one ream of printer paper occu-
pies, whereas a company seeking to store 500,000 pages of paper docu-
ments would have to allocate, at the very least, 1000 times as much 
physical space and ensure that such space could handle the approximate 
two-and-a-half tons that the paper would weigh.30  Put simply, the more 
documents a company seeks to store in paper form, the more resources 
it must allocate to the physical infrastructure necessary to house and 
manage the documents.  Although some companies stored large quanti-
ties of information prior to the advent of ESI,31 most did not allocate 
their resources in this way and thus did not have to grapple with enorm-
ous repositories of potentially discoverable information when civil litiga-
tion arose.  
With the advent of the electronic storage of information, the rela-
tionship between volume and cost in the storage of information—as well 
as the cost of creating such information—fundamentally changed, lead-
ing to the rapid accretion of ESI throughout our society.32  The differ-
ence between the cost of storing 500 pages of information on a computer 
hard drive and 500,000 or 5 million or 50 million pages is, at best, neg-
ligible in an environment where ordinary consumer hard drives that can 
hold as much as two terabytes of data cost less than 150 dollars.33  If 
used solely for storage purposes, a hard drive of this size could hold well 
over 100 million pages of documents in a physical space smaller than a 
single 500-sheet ream of paper.34  Accompanying this decrease in the 
cost of storing information was the rapid spread of technologies, such as 
 
 30. See How Much Does 20-Pound Bond Paper Weigh?, HOW STUFF WORKS, 
http://home.howstuffworks.com/question329.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2012) (“[A] 500-
sheet ream of 20-pound bond paper weighs 5 pounds.”). 
 31. See Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Au-
tonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 546 n.103 
(2003) (describing the production of millions of pages of paper documents in Castano 
tobacco litigation); see also In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 
1073 (3d Cir. 1980) (antitrust case involving millions of documents and over 100,000 
pages of depositions); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99, 101 (W.D. Wash. 
1976) (securities fraud case involving more than 900,000 documents). 
 32. See Data, Data Everywhere, supra note 7, at 1. 
 33. See, e.g., BEST BUY, http://www.bestbuy.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2012) (follow 
“Products: Computers & Tablets: Hard Drives & Storage” hyperlink; then follow “Hard 
Drives” hyperlink; then follow “2TB and Up” hyperlink) (listing nine 2 terabyte hard 
drives for sale for less than $150). 
 34. See In re Aspartame Antitrust Litig., No. 2:06-CV-1732, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
118226, at *8–9 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2011) (noting that a party collected 1.05 terabytes of 
data, which amounted to 75 million pages of information, and indicating that 2 terabytes 
of data would amount to well over 100 million pages of information). 
7
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personal computers and e-mail, that make creating, copying, and distri-
buting ESI easier than ever, resulting in an exponential increase in the 
amount of ESI that we, as a society, create and store.35 
Not surprisingly, as the ubiquity of electronic data increased, ESI 
began to appear more frequently as an issue in civil litigation.36  Al-
though ESI represented nothing more than a new storage medium, its 
appearance in civil litigation caused a broad range of problems and chal-
lenges, the most enduring and intractable of which relate directly to the 
sheer volume of information that can come into play during discovery.37  
For example, parties have long struggled with the issue of how to effec-
tively preserve large quantities of ESI once litigation begins or is reason-
ably anticipated.38  However, from a financial and logistical perspective, 
few issues have proven as difficult to surmount as how to manage dis-
covery in an environment in which even a legitimate request for produc-
tion can require a party to collect, process, search, review, and produce 
ESI that is spread across thousands of potential repositories,39 and en-
compasses millions of pages of documents.40 
 
 35. See Paul & Baron, supra note 9, ¶ 9 (noting that “recently there has been an evo-
lutionary burst in writing technology” that includes “digitization; real time computing; 
the microprocessor; the personal computer, e-mail; local and wide-area networks leading 
to the Internet; [and] . . . the World Wide Web”) (citations omitted); The Demise of Li-
near Review, supra note 8, at 1.  See generally Baron & Losey, supra note 8. 
 36. See Dan H. Willoughby, Jr. et al., Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the 
Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789, 794–95 (documenting the rise of e-discovery sanction cases 
between 1996 and 2009). 
 37. See Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 557–58 (W.D. 
Tenn. 2003) (estimating that privilege review of ESI at issue would have cost between 
$16.5 million and $70 million); 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 22–23 (“Electron-
ically stored information is characterized by exponentially greater volume than hard-
copy documents.”); Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 
DUKE L.J. 561, 592 (2001) (“[E]lectronic discovery can be predicted, as a general matter, 
to give rise to burdens and expense that are of a completely different magnitude from 
those encountered in traditional discovery.”). 
 38. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218–19 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(describing the loss of data resulting from failure to preserve records despite the exis-
tence of a corporate data retention policy). 
 39. Bank of Am. Corp. v. SR Int’l Bus. Ins. Co., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *7–8 (N.C. 
Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2006) (noting that a party’s original discovery request would have re-
quired recipient to identify, restore, extract, convert and process approximately 2500 
backup tapes at a cost of over $1.5 million). 
 40. See In re Aspartame Antitrust Litig., No. 2:06-CV-1732-LDD, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 118226, at *8–9 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2011) (noting that a party collected ESI 
amounting to 75 million pages of information); Thermal Design, Inc. v. Guardian Bldg. 
Prods., No. 08-C-828, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50108, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 20, 2011) 
(noting that party produced 1.46 million pages of documents under ESI protocol); John 
8
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Litigants have exacerbated the volume-cost challenges of ESI 
through the increased use of discovery as an adversarial tool in civil liti-
gation.41  Although originally intended to “secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding,”42 the liberal 
discovery rules that are now commonplace throughout the United States 
have struggled to live up to this ideal.43  Over time, and for reasons that 
are beyond the scope of this article, litigants have used discovery as a 
strategic opportunity to gain some type of advantage over their adversa-
ries, rather than as a tool to ensure that disputes are resolved based on a 
fair and complete understanding of the relevant facts.44  The result of 
this adversarial approach is that, when parties engage in full-blown dis-
covery, the associated costs amount to as much as 90% of the overall ex-
penses incurred in the litigation.45 
When combined with the volume of potentially discoverable ESI, 
this adversarial approach to discovery has—in many instances—driven 
the scope and cost of discovery beyond any reasonable bounds.46  For 
example, in a case before the North Carolina Business Court, a party 
served a Rule 45 subpoena on a third party that, if strictly enforced, 
would have required the recipient to search for ESI across 2500 backup 
 
B. v. Goetz, No. 3:98-0168, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8821, at *249 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 1, 
2011) (discovery requests were estimated to require production of 15 million pages of 
ESI at a cost of up to $10 million). 
 41. John H. Beisner, Discovering A Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation 
Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 551–52, 557–58, 571–72 (2010) (discussing abuse of the dis-
covery process); Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. 
REV. 1, 17–19 (1984) (discussing abuse of the discovery process). 
 42. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 43.  See Beisner, supra note 41, at 584–97 (advocating for reform of the discovery 
process in light of abuse of system). 
 44. Network Computing Servs. Corp. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 223 F.R.D. 392, 395 (D.S.C. 
2004) (reflecting on what the court termed “[h]ardball discovery,” and noting that in or-
der to gain an advantage “parties often overreach in their discovery requests and stone-
wall interrogatories from their opponents,” concluding that this state of affairs “is costly 
to our system and consumes an inordinate amount of judicial resources” (citations omit-
ted)). 
 45. Judicial Conference Adopts Rules Changes, Confronts Projected Budget Shortfalls, 
THE THIRD BRANCH (U.S. Courts Office of Pub. Affairs, Washington, D.C.), October 1999, 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/99-10-
01/Judicial_Conference_Adopts_Rules_Changes_Confronts_Projected_Budget_Shortfall.
aspx (“Discovery represents 50 percent of the litigation costs in the average case and up 
to 90 percent of the litigation costs in cases in which it is actively used.”). 
 46. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 557–58 (W.D. 
Tenn. 2003) (estimating that a review of ESI requested in discovery would cost between 
$16.5 million and $70 million). 
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tapes at a cost of over $1.5 million, even though it had no formal role in 
the litigation and, instead, was simply a repository of information of po-
tential relevance to the dispute.47  In another case also involving a third-
party subpoena, a government agency spent over $6 million (or approx-
imately 9% of its annual budget) on e-discovery after the parties who 
served the subpoena took advantage of the wording of a stipulated ESI 
protocol to submit a list of 400 search terms that yielded 660,000 res-
ponsive documents.48  As these types of challenges first began emerging 
in the mid-1990s, the federal judiciary took note and the Federal Rules 
Committee launched an effort, discussed in the next section of this ar-
ticle, to examine and address the challenges of e-discovery. 
II. ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
A.  The Introduction of Electronic Records into Federal Discovery 
In 1970, the Federal Rules Committee revised Rule 34 of the Feder-
al Rules of Civil Procedure (the “1970 Amendment”) to expand the defi-
nition of “documents” to “accord with changing technology,”49 and ac-
commodate what turned out to be the extraordinarily understated view 
“that the use of computerized information would increase.”50  Whereas 
Rule 34 originally “focused on discovery of ‘documents’ and ‘things,’”51 
the 1970 Amendment introduced “electronic data compilations from 
which information can be obtained only with the use of detection devic-
es” into the definition of “documents.” 52  The effect of such amendment 
 
 47. Bank of Am. Corp. v. SR Int’l Bus. Ins. Co., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *7–8, *14–
16 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2006); see also Response to Motion to Compel, Exhibit 2, 
Affidavit of Dennis Richter, Bank of Am. Corp., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17 (No. 05-CVS-
5564), available at http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/TCDDotNetPublic/default.aspx?CID= 
3&caseNumber=05CVS5564; Response to Motion to Compel, Exhibit 3, Affidavit of Carl 
Hardel, Bank of Am. Corp., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17 (No. 05-CVS-5564), available at 
http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/TCDDotNetPublic/default.aspx?CID=3&caseNumber=0
5CVS5564. 
 48. In Re Fannie Mae Sec. Litig., 552 F.3d 814, 817 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 49. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (Subdivision (a) of Advisory Committee’s notes on 1970 
amendments). 
 50. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (Subdivision (a) of Advisory Committee’s notes on 2006 
amendments). 
 51. Id. 
 52. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (Subdivision (a) of Advisory Committee’s notes on 1970 
amendments). 
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was to require a party to produce in “reasonably usable form”53 electronic 
data that otherwise was “usable by the discovering party only through 
[the producing party’s] devices.”54  Although this often meant supplying 
a printout of computer data based on the technology available at the 
time,55 the revised rule “did not preclude production of the information 
in an electronic medium.”56  The fundamental effect of the 1970 
Amendment was to expand discovery to include documents in electronic 
or computerized form.57 
The 1970 Amendment, however, did not provide adequate guidance 
with respect to “when ‘data compilations’ or other types of electronic 
documents have to be produced and in what form they should be pro-
duced.”58  In other words, while amended Rule 34 rendered certain elec-
tronic data the equivalent of “traditional paper documents,”59 doubt re-
mained as to the precise reach of the rule.60  Courts, thus, had little 
choice but to interpret and apply the Rules with respect to various forms 
 
 53. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1)(A). 
 54. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (Subdivision (a) of Advisory Committee’s notes on 1970 
amendments). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Nat’l Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1257, 1262 
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (citing 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 2218 (2d ed. 1970)). 
 57. See, e.g., Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 2120 (LMM) (AJP), 
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16355, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1995) (stating “today it is black let-
ter law that computerized data is discoverable if relevant”); Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Craig, 
995 F.2d 1376, 1382–83 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating “the Advisory Committee notes to the 
1970 amendment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 make clear that computer data is 
included in Rule 34’s description of documents”); Nat’l Union Elec. Corp., 494 F. Supp. at 
1261–62 (indicating that computerized records are subject to requests for production 
based on the 1970 amendment to FED. R. CIV. P. 34). 
 58. Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 649 (D. Kan. 2005). 
 59. The Sedona Principles: Best Practices, Recommendations & Principles for Addressing 
Electronic Document Discovery, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP SERIES, (Sedona 
Conference, Sedona, Ariz.) at iii (2005), http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/ 
miscFiles/7_05TSP.pdf [hereinafter The Sedona Principles]. 
 60. Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 650 (“[A]lthough Rule 34 was amended in 1970 to add 
‘data compilations’ to the list of discoverable documents, there was no suggestion that 
‘data compilations’ was intended to turn all forms of ‘data’ into a Rule 34 ‘document.’” 
(citing The Sedona Principles, supra note 59, at 37 cmt. 9.a)).  In Williams, the District of 
Kansas was faced with the question of whether “a court order directing a party to pro-
duce electronic documents as they are maintained in the ordinary course of business re-
quires the producing party to produce those documents with the metadata intact.”  Id. at 
648.  The court found that “neither Rule 34” as amended in 1970, “nor its advisory com-
mittee notes” provided a definitive answer to this question.  Id. at 648–49. 
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of electronic documents and data on an ad hoc basis.61  However, given 
the vast categories of electronic documents and data that would soon 
emerge (some very different in nature to traditional paper documents, 
and many not contemplated or conceived of in 1970), such an ad hoc 
approach was perhaps destined to cause uncertainty regarding the dis-
covery of electronic records. 
However, the uncertainty regarding the scope of Rule 34 after the 
1970 Amendment was not the lone complicating factor for e-discovery.  
As discussed above, volume is a transcendent issue with respect to the 
discovery of ESI, particularly relative to paper records.  As the Federal 
Rules Committee observed, ESI “is characterized by exponentially great-
er volume than hard-copy documents,” in part due to the “capacity of 
large organizations’ computer networks.” 62  Moreover, unlike paper 
records, electronically stored information is not static; rather, such in-
formation is susceptible to proliferation, modification, or deletion, even 
“without the operator’s specific direction or knowledge,” or by virtue of 
seemingly innocuous actions, such as “merely turning a computer on or 
off.”63  Finally, whereas paper records are by their nature self-revealing, 
the substance or significance of ESI, in some cases, may not be learned 
or understood apart from software or other electronic files on which the 
information is dependent.64 
Recognizing these idiosyncrasies and the issues that they create in 
discovery, the Federal Rules Committee began in 1996 to review “the 
experiences of the bar and bench” in order to determine whether the 
changes in technology called for further rule making.65  The Committee 
found not only a lack of uniformity in the courts’ treatment of ESI, but 
also that the discovery of ESI was “becoming more time-consuming, 
burdensome, and costly.”66  The Committee also found that the existing 
 
 61. See The Sedona Principles, supra note 59, at 37 cmt. 9.a (considering what data 
should be treated as discoverable “documents” and noting that “the evaluation of the 
need for and relevance of such discovery should be separately analyzed on a case-by-case 
basis” (citing Mcpeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 33 (D.D.C. 2001))). 
 62. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 22–23 (noting that, at the time, such net-
works “store[d] information in terabytes, each of which represents the equivalent of 500 
million typewritten pages of plain text, and [received] 250 to 300 million e-mail messag-
es monthly”). 
 63. Id. at 23. 
 64. Id. at 23; see also Byers v. Ill. State Police, No. 99 C 8105, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
9861, at *31–33 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2002) (discussing differences between paper-based 
discovery and discovery of e-mail); The Sedona Principles, supra note 59, at 3–6 (discuss-
ing the differences between electronic documents and paper documents). 
 65. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 23. 
 66. Id. 
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discovery rules provided “inadequate guidance to litigants, judges, and 
lawyers in determining discovery rights and obligations in particular 
cases.”67  The Committee wrote: 
Developing case law on discovery into electronically stored information 
under the current rules is not consistent and is necessarily limited by the 
specific facts involved.  Disparate local rules have enlarged to fill this gap 
between the existing discovery rules and practice, and more courts are 
considering local rules.  Without national rules adequate to address the 
issues raised by electronic discovery, a patchwork of rules and require-
ments is likely to develop.68 
As a result of this review process, the Federal Rules Committee 
concluded that new rules were necessary to address the discovery of ESI 
and that any such rules must be tailored to address concerns beyond 
parties’ mere access to various forms and volumes of information. 69  In-
deed, the Federal Rules Committee instructed that, ideally, any new 
rules should seek “to reduce the costs of discovery, to increase its effi-
ciency, to increase uniformity of practice, and to encourage the judiciary 
to participate more actively in case management where appropriate.”70  
After recognizing that “timely action” had to be taken “to make the feder-
al discovery rules better able to accommodate the distinctive features of 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id.; see also id. at 24 (indicating that “[t]he costs of complying with unclear and 
at times vague discovery obligations, which vary from district to district in ways unwar-
ranted by local variations in practice, are becoming increasingly problematic”); Niemeyer 
Memorandum, infra note 69, at 4 (noting that “the cost of discovery represents approx-
imately 50% of the litigation costs in all cases, and as much as 90% of the litigation costs 
in the cases where discovery is actively employed”).  Compare Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. Wil-
liam Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (adopting a test designed 
to determine whether to shift the costs of electronic discovery), with Zubulake v. UBS 
Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 320–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (modifying and replacing the 
test announced in Rowe one year later with new multi-factor test). 
 69. See, e.g., Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil 
Rules, to Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 3 (May 
11, 1999), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/repcivil.pdf [herei-
nafter “Niemeyer Memorandum”] (noting that “for many years before [the commence-
ment of the Committee’s discovery project in 1996], the Committee had received com-
plaints from the bar and the public that discovery costs too much”); see also FED. R. CIV. 
P. 26. (Subdivision (f) of Advisory Committee’s notes on the 2006 Amendments) (noting 
that inadvertent production of privileged information is a further concern due to the fact 
that the sheer volume of data “may make privilege determinations more difficult, and 
privilege review correspondingly more expensive and time consuming,” while at the 
same time reducing the likelihood that parties will correctly identify privileged informa-
tion). 
 70. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 24. 
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electronic discovery,” the Committee further revised the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in 1999 to address the discovery of ESI. 71 
B.  The 2006 Amendments 
In September 2005, the Federal Rules Committee delivered its Re-
port of the Judicial Conference72—comprising its recommendations and 
proposed amendments to the Federal Rules—to the Supreme Court for 
consideration.  On April 12, 2006, the United States Supreme Court ap-
proved the Committee’s proposed amendments,73 and with the tacit ap-
proval of Congress, the amendments went into effect on November 1, 
2006. 
The 2006 Amendments included revisions to Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, and 45, in large part addressing issues re-
lated to the discovery of electronically stored information.74  Specifically, 
the Amendments were as follows: 
  Rule 16(b) was amended “to invite the court to address the disclo-
sure or discovery of electronically stored information in the Rule 16 
scheduling order.” 75  This amendment was one of several designed to 
encourage “the handling of discovery of electronically stored information 
early in the litigation, if such discovery is expected to occur.”76  Rule 
16(b) was further amended to allow for judicial orders adopting any 
agreements by the parties to protect as privileged any inadvertently pro-
duced trial-preparation material.77 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 22 (noting that the report was a product of significant “time and energy” 
contributed to by “bar organizations, attorneys, computer specialists, and members of the 
public,” and further noting that “the committee’s study included several mini-conferences 
and one major conference, bringing together lawyers, academics, judges, and litigants 
with a variety of experiences and viewpoints”). 
 73. Letter from John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to 
Dick Cheney, President, U.S. Senate (Apr. 12, 2006), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv06p.pdf); Letter from John G. Ro-
berts, Jr., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker, House 
of Representatives (Apr. 12, 2006), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/ 
frcv06p.pdf. 
 74. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 22. 
 75. Id. at 26.  See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b). 
 76. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 26.  The Committee noted that the 
“amendments to Rule 16, Rule 26(a) and (f), and Form 35 present[ed] a framework for 
the parties and the court to give early attention to issues relating to electronic discovery, 
including the frequently-recurring problems of the preservation of evidence and the as-
sertion of privilege and work-product protection.”  Id. 
 77. Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iv). 
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  Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) (formerly Rule 26(a)(1)(B)) was amended to 
replace “data compilations” with “electronically stored information” as 
information that a party must include in its initial disclosures.78 
  Rule 26(b)(2)(B) was amended to clarify that a party “need not pro-
vide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that the 
party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or 
cost,” provided that the party must, on motion to compel such informa-
tion, show that the information is not reasonably accessible for these 
reasons.79 
  Rule 26(b)(5)(B) was amended to provide a procedure whereby a 
party that inadvertently produces work-product material may assert a 
claim of privilege as to such material, thereby protecting it from further 
disclosure.80  The Committee noted that this amendment was designed 
to parallel those to Rules 16 and 26(f).81  The amended Rule further puts 
a burden on the receiving party to “take reasonable steps to retrieve the 
information,” even where the information was disclosed prior to its hav-
ing been notified as to the claim of privilege.82 
  Rule 26(f) was amended to provide for discussion of “any issues re-
lating to disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information” 
during the parties’ conference.83  As the Committee notes, the “topics to 
be discussed include the form of producing electronically stored infor-
mation, . . . preservation, . . . [and] whether they can agree on approach-
es to asserting claims of privilege or work-product protection after inad-
vertent production in discovery.”84 
  Rule 33(d) was amended to clarify that a party “may answer an inter-
rogatory . . . by providing access to the [electronically stored] informa-
 
 78. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 26 (noting that this amendment “makes 
the rule consistent with disclosure practices in the courts and with the proposed elec-
tronic discovery amendment”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
 79. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
 80. Id.; 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 29. 
 81. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 29.  The Committee further noted that: 
Under the proposed amendments to Rules 26(f) and 16, if the parties are able 
to reach an agreement to adopt protocols for asserting privilege and work-
product protection claims that will facilitate discovery that is faster and at a 
lower cost, they may ask the court to include such arrangements in a case-
management or other order. 
Id. at 27. 
 82. Id. at 29. 
 83. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 26–27; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f). 
 84. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 26–27. 
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tion if [the requesting] party can find the answer as readily as the res-
ponding party can.”85  
  Rule 34(a) was amended to “explicitly recognize [electronically 
stored information] as a category subject to discovery . . . distinct from 
‘documents’ and ‘things.’”86  In addition to addressing the uncertainty 
surrounding the previously utilized term “data compilations,” the Com-
mittee noted that this amendment served to further distinguish “between 
documents and electronically stored information, mak[ing] it clear that 
there are differences between them important to managing discovery.”87 
  Rule 34(b) was amended to “authorize a requesting party to specify 
the form of production, such as in paper or electronic form,” and to al-
low for “the responding party to object.”88 
  Rule 37(f) was amended to provide “limited protection against sanc-
tions . . . for a party’s failure to provide electronically stored information 
in discovery.”89  Specifically, “sanctions may not be imposed . . . if elec-
tronically stored information sought in discovery has been lost as a re-
sult of the routine operation of an electronic information system, as long 
as that operation is in good faith.”90 
  Rule 45 was amended to conform “the provisions for subpoenas to 
changes in other discovery rules related to discovery of electronically 
stored information.”91 
Collectively, the 2006 Amendments were designed to recognize and 
respond to the conclusion reached by the Sedona Conference Working 
Group that “dialogue between litigants is a prerequisite to resolving (or 
avoiding) potentially costly and disruptive electronic discovery dis-
putes.”92  Under the 2006 Amendments, parties are encouraged to com-
municate, and to get out in front of e-discovery issues, nearly at the on-
set of litigation.  This may be achieved by: (1) collaborating to “identify 
 
 85. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 27; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 33(d). 
 86. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 28; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a). 
 87. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 28. 
 88. Id. (noting that this amended rule “provides an electronic discovery analogue to 
existing language that prevents massive ‘dumps’ of disorganized documents by requiring 
production of documents as they are ordinarily maintained or labeled to correspond with 
the categories in the request”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b). 
 89. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 33; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f). 
 90. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f). 
 91. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 28; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 45. 
 92. The Sedona Principles, supra note 59, at iv (noting further that “parties are well-
served by an early discussion about the issues in dispute, the types of information 
sought, the likely sources and locations of such information, and the realistic costs of 
identifying, locating, retrieving, reviewing, and producing such data”). 
16
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the various sources of . . . information within [their] control that should 
be searched for electronically stored information”;93 (2) discussing 
“whether the information is reasonably accessible to the party that has it, 
including the burden or cost of retrieving and reviewing the informa-
tion”;94 and (3) discussing the “form or forms in which electronically 
stored information might be produced,”95 along with “any issues regard-
ing preservation of discoverable information.”96  This approach to pro-
moting communication and cooperation has proven extremely effective 
at addressing the challenges of e-discovery.97 
C. The Impact of the 2006 Amendments 
The 2006 Amendments have significantly impacted the manage-
ment of e-discovery in the federal courts as a result of two central prin-
ciples that the new rules emphasize: cooperation and proportionality.  In 
the years since their adoption, courts have actively embraced and pro-
moted the idea that e-discovery should be a collaborative process that 
strives to reach the information most relevant to any given dispute in as 
efficient a manner as possible.98  Through application of the aspects of 
the 2006 Amendments that promote cooperation between counsel and 
proportional limitations on the scope of discovery, the federal courts 
have made great strides in addressing the challenges of e-discovery, re-
ducing the associated burdens on the parties, and decreasing the number 
of discovery disputes presented to the courts for resolution. 
i. Cooperation under the 2006 Amendments 
One of the central goals of the 2006 Amendments is to foster great-
er levels of cooperation between litigants in the discovery process and, in 
 
 93. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (Subdivision (b)(2) of Advisory Committee’s notes on 
2006 Amendments). 
 94. Id. 
 95. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (Subdivision (f) of Advisory Committee’s notes on 2006 
Amendments). 
 96. Id. 
 97. See Lee & Withers, supra note 17, at 207 (finding that 71.4% of surveyed magi-
strate judges reported that the 2006 amendment to Rule 26(f) was at least somewhat ef-
fective in “improving the conduct of Rule 16(b) pretrial conferences,” and that 70.5% re-
ported it “as at least somewhat effective in encouraging the parties to cooperate,” and 
finally that 61.1% of magistrate judges reported it as at least somewhat effective in “re-
duc[ing] the number of e-discovery disputes” the survey participants were asked to de-
cide). 
 98. See id. 
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particular, with respect to e-discovery.99  The new rules do not go so far 
as to require parties to compromise or impose explicit penalties on par-
ties who fail to do so, but they do emphasize the importance of early 
identification of e-discovery issues and the need for concerted efforts to 
address such issues in discovery plans and scheduling orders.100  The 
goal of this collaborative approach is to promote engagement between 
the parties on issues where cooperative agreements can reduce the scope 
of discovery and the likelihood of disputes erupting over ESI-related is-
sues.101  This approach also facilitates early communication between the 
parties so that, once discovery begins, the parties can proceed with a bet-
ter sense of what lays ahead with respect to electronic discovery and 
with a more unified understanding of what each party’s rights and obli-
gations are in this regard.102 
Recognizing the clear advantages of having parties take greater re-
sponsibility for the scope and contours of the discovery process, the fed-
eral judiciary has whole-heartedly embraced this collaborative approach, 
with certain judges noting that “communication among counsel is crucial 
to a successful electronic discovery process”103 and that “parties should 
cooperate as much as possible[,] . . . for this collaboration helps . . . to 
focus [discovery] on matters reasonably calculated to produce evidence 
admissible at trial.”104  Indeed, as the 2006 Amendments have matured, 
courts have increasingly framed cooperation as less of an aspirational 
goal and more of a mandatory requirement,105 with at least one district 
court adopting a local rule that explicitly requires counsel to cooperate 
with one another in discovery.106   
Parties have, in general, responded positively to this shift away from 
a more adversarial paradigm in discovery.  As a result, the federal courts 
 
 99. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (Advisory Committee’s notes on 2006 Amendments). 
 100. See id. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See id. 
 103. Romero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. 96, 109 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (emphasis add-
ed). 
 104. Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, 655 F. Supp. 2d 146, 149 (D. Mass. 2009) 
(citation omitted). 
 105. See Cartel Asset Mgmt. v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 01-cv-01644-REB-CBS, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17857, at *41 (D. Colo. Feb. 8, 2010) (mandating that counsel coope-
rate in all aspects of discovery). 
 106. M.D.N.C. RULES OF PRAC. & PROC., R. 26.1(b)(1) (2011), available at 
http://www.ncmd.uscourts.gov/CIV_LR.pdf (“The Court expects counsel to conduct dis-
covery in good faith and to cooperate and be courteous with each other in all phases of 
the discovery process.”). 
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have seen an increase in collaborative agreements reached on a wide va-
riety of electronic discovery-related issues.  For example, in one matter, 
the parties agreed to limit the scope of email production for the explicit 
purpose of “streamlin[ing] the discovery process and reduc[ing] ex-
penses.” 107  In another matter, the parties limited the scope and burdens 
of e-discovery by agreeing that “the only relevant documents containing 
electronically stored information” were emails, which “would be pro-
duced in PDF format.”108  Agreements such as these—addressing scope 
and format—have become common in the wake of the 2006 Amend-
ments and are designed specifically to reduce the cost of discovering 
ESI.109  Even when parties have failed to reach agreement, the coopera-
tive discussions in which they engaged have provided the court a solid 
foundation on which to craft an ultimate resolution of the dispute.110 
In order to reinforce the importance and significance of collabora-
tion, courts have—by and large—held parties to ESI-related agreements, 
even where doing so resulted in one party experiencing the very burdens 
such agreements aim to reduce.  For instance, courts have required par-
ties to abide by agreements regarding the format in which they will pro-
duce ESI,111 and the search protocols that they will employ.112  In one 
 
 107. Widevine Techs., Inc. v. Verimatrix, Inc., No. 2-07-cv-321, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 115264, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2009). 
 108. Palm Bay Int’l, Inc. v. Marchesi Di Barolo S.P.A., No. CV 09-601 (ADS) (AKT), 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104020, at *21 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2009) (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 109. See, e.g., Kay Beer Distrib. v. Energy Brands, Inc., No. 07-C-1068, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 130595, at *17 (E.D. Wis. June 10, 2009) (noting that “the parties had agreed at 
their Rule 26 conference that either a hard copy or electronic copy [of responsive docu-
ments] would be produced depending on what was most cost-effective”); Hassaine v. 
Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 09CV2215-MMA (BGS), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34117, at 
*12 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2011) (noting that “the parties agreed to produce any electronic 
information in written format”); White v. Honda of Am. Mfg., 2:07-CV-216, 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 112102, at *11 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 31, 2008) (noting that “the parties agreed in 
the Rule 26(f) Report to produce all documents on paper”). 
 110. See, e.g., Barrera v. Boughton, No. 3:07cv1436(RNC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
103491, at *8–12 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2010) (crafting a phased ESI protocol that incor-
porated elements from the proposals that each party made when they were unable to 
reach agreement on the scope of electronic discovery). 
 111. See, e.g., Nissan N. Am., Inc. v. Johnson Elec. N. Am., Inc., No. 09-CV-11783, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43753, at *12–13 (E.D. Mich. May 5, 2010) (ordering production 
“in accordance with Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(i),” which provides for production “in a form or 
forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable form or forms”). 
 112. See, e.g., Oracle USA, Inc. v. SAP AG, 264 F.R.D. 541, 556–57 (N.D. Cal. 2009) 
(declining to permit discovery of expanded damages claims, given that the parties had, at 
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notable example, a court enforced a stipulated ESI protocol that could be 
read to allow one party to the agreement the unilateral discretion to de-
signate the search terms that the other party would have to use when 
searching for documents responsive to a Rule 45 subpoena.113  Even 
though the agreement contained language suggesting that this discretion 
was somewhat limited, the party who held the discretion exercised it in 
an extraordinarily broad fashion to designate over 400 search terms.114  
The court enforced the agreement as written, which resulted in the sub-
poena recipient incurring costs of over $6 million responding to the 
subpoena.115  Courts have even shown the willingness to enforce infor-
mal agreements related to e-discovery where justified by the surrounding 
circumstances.116 
Consistent with the new focus on collaboration, courts are increa-
singly willing to step in and demand cooperation when parties submit 
discovery disputes to the court for resolution.117  For example, in Mancia 
v. Mayflower Textile Services Co.,118 Magistrate Judge Paul Grimm or-
dered the parties to meet and confer based on concerns about the 
breadth of requested discovery in light of the modest amount at stake in 
the litigation.119  In so doing, Judge Grimm noted that, had the parties 
cooperated and communicated at the start of discovery, “most, if not all, 
of [their discovery] disputes could have been resolved without involving 
 
the outset of the case, agreed to direct search terms to a narrower set of damage theo-
ries). 
 113. In re Fannie Mae Sec. Litig., 552 F.3d 814, 817 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. In re Classicstar Mare Lease Litig., No. 5:07-cv-353-JMH, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
9750, at *26 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 2, 2009) (enforcing an agreement to produce ESI in native 
format based on an informal exchange between the parties); see also Oracle USA, Inc., 
264 F.R.D. at 556–57 (declining to permit discovery of expanded damages claims, given 
that the parties had, at the outset of the case, agreed to direct search terms to a narrower 
set of damage theories).  But see Susquehanna Commer. Fin. v. Vascular Res., Inc., No. 
1:09-CV-2012, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127125, at *5–6 (M.D. Pa., Dec. 1, 2010) (refusing 
plaintiff’s request to enforce agreement reached with the defendants’ prior counsel, “par-
ticularly as some of the current defendants were not even named in the case when such 
an agreement was reached, and particularly because plaintiff has failed to persuade the 
Court that producing ESI and other data in native format will be unduly burdensome”). 
 117. See, e.g., Dunkin’ Donuts Franchised Rests. LLC v. Grand Cent. Donuts, Inc., 
No. CV 2007-4027(ENV)(MDG), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52261, at *14–15 (E.D.N.Y. 
June 19, 2009) (directing parties to “meet and confer on developing a workable search 
protocol” and noting that Rule 26(f) requires the parties to formulate a discovery plan 
addressing such issues). 
 118. Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354 (D. Md. 2008). 
 119. Id. at 364–65. 
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the court.”120  Other courts have adopted a similar approach,121 with 
some courts even citing the failure of the parties to cooperate early in the 
litigation as the basis for denying discovery sought later in the same pro-
ceeding.122  Indeed, courts have shown no reticence in openly and vocal-
ly expressing their displeasure with parties who fail to communicate and 
cooperate with one another on e-discovery issues.123 
In a clear sign of the degree to which the federal judiciary has em-
braced cooperation as a means of streamlining the discovery process, 
courts have increasingly looked to and relied on The Sedona Conference 
 
 120. Id. at 365. 
 121. See, e.g., Ross v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., Nos. 2:05-CV-0819,2:05-cv-
0848,2:05-CV-0879,2:05-CV-0893,2:05-CV-0913,2:05-CV-0959, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
47620 (S.D. Ohio May 14, 2010) (instructing the parties to meet and confer regarding 
search protocols as part of effort to locate certain of defendants’ documents); Burt Hill, 
Inc. v. Hassan, No. 09-1285, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7492, at *34 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2010) 
(ordering the parties to “promptly meet and confer to determine whether the scope of 
Defendants’ [overbroad discovery requests] can be narrowed, [and] whether they can 
agree upon . . . ‘search terms’” to use in attempting to identify responsive documents); 
Marion v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 1:06cv969-LTS-RHW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
27082, at *12 (S.D. Miss. March 17, 2008) (chastising parties for having “done little to 
resolve their perceived differences on document production,” and demanding the “mu-
tual cooperation of the parties” prospectively, and also threatening sanctions on “any 
one—party or counsel or both—who engages in any conduct that causes unnecessary 
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation”). 
 122. See, e.g., Sentis Group, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 559 F.3d 888, 891 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(noting the court’s belief that “neither party behaved in a manner consistent with the spi-
rit of cooperation, openness, and candor owed to fellow litigants and the court and called 
for in modern discovery”); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 3:07-
cv-449, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70514, at *8 (S.D. Ohio July 24, 2009) (refusing to grant a 
motion compelling additional discovery where the parties “could have avoided the ex-
penses of [the] Motion by conferring appropriately early in the case about ESI”). 
 123. See, e.g., Seven Seas Cruises  v. V. Ships Leisure, No. 09-23411-CIV-
UNGARO/SIMONTON, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7063, at *18 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2011) 
(concluding that “the ESI dispute in [the] case was primarily caused by the parties’ mu-
tual failure to communicate and work together in a good faith effort to resolve the areas 
of dispute”); Accounting Prin., Inc. v. Solomon Edwards Grp., LLC, No. 09-2085-CM, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82071, at *4 (D. Kan. Aug. 12, 2010) (decrying the lack of “mea-
ningful discussion about the specific discovery requests at issue” and calling the dispute 
“the litigation equivalent of the cafeteria food fight scene in the infamous movie Animal 
House” before ordering a conference to discuss salient issues); Capitol Records, Inc. v. 
Mp3tunes, LLC, 261 F.R.D. 44, 50 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (criticizing the parties for having 
drafted “dueling epistles for submission to the court” rather than focusing “their attention 
on discussing their differences”). 
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Cooperation Proclamation124 (Cooperation Proclamation), which carries no 
precedential or persuasive authority, to define the obligations of counsel 
in discovery.  Issued after adoption of the 2006 Amendments and moti-
vated by both “economy and logic,”125 the Cooperation Proclamation was 
drafted as part of an effort “to promote open and forthright information 
sharing, dialogue (internal and external), training, and the development 
of practical tools to facilitate cooperative, collaborative, transparent dis-
covery.”126  The Cooperation Proclamation identified specific methods 
that litigants can use to facilitate cooperation and outlined a broad three-
step process to integrate this new approach to discovery into the litiga-
tion process by (1) promoting greater awareness of the need for coopera-
tion, (2) developing a full understanding of the changes needed to pro-
mote greater cooperation, and (3) developing practical “toolkits” to 
support what the authors described as a “paradigm shift for the discovery 
process.”127 
Although only three pages in length, courts have repeatedly in-
voked the Cooperation Proclamation when reminding parties of their ob-
ligations to cooperate and communicate, and—in some cases—when 
requiring such cooperation and communication.  For example, the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania cited the Cooperation Proclamation when di-
recting counsel “to work in a cooperative, rather than an adversarial 
manner, to resolve discovery issues,” and stating its expectation that the 
parties will “reach practical agreement” on e-discovery-related issues.128  
Similarly, the Southern District of New York explicitly endorsed the Co-
operation Proclamation when stating that “the best solution in the entire 
area of electronic discovery is cooperation among counsel.”129  When 
confronted with parties who had a “strained” relationship, the District of 
Kansas “directed [the parties] to read” the Cooperation Proclamation in 
 
 124. Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING 
GROUP SERIES: DIALOGUE DESIGNED TO MOVE THE LAW FORWARD IN A REASONED AND JUST 
WAY, (Sedona Conference, Sedona, Ariz. 2008), http://www.thesedonaconference.org/ 
content/tsc_cooperation_proclamation/proclamation.pdf [hereinafter Cooperation Proc-
lamation]. 
 125. Id. at 1. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 3. 
 128. Romero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. 96, 109 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (citing Coopera-
tion Proclamation, supra note 124, at 1–3; SEC v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 256 F.R.D. 
403, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 129. William A. Gross Constr. Assocs. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 256 F.R.D. 134, 
136 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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order to “help [them] understand their obligations.”130  Numerous other 
courts have similarly relied on the Cooperation Proclamation,131 indicat-
ing the level of importance that the federal judiciary has assigned to co-
operative discovery in the wake of the 2006 Amendments. 
This new focus on communication, cooperation, and collaboration 
has been effective in addressing some of the challenges of e-discovery 
and reducing the associated burdens.  In a recent survey of federal magi-
strate judges, respondents reported that the 2006 Amendments had “en-
couraged more cooperation” and “reduced the number of e-discovery 
disputes.”132  In large part, the willingness of the courts to enforce and 
litigants to embrace this break from the traditional adversarial model of 
discovery has driven these results.   
While effective at addressing certain challenges of e-discovery, co-
operation alone cannot eliminate every ESI-related issue from the dis-
covery process.  Even when parties succeed in reaching cooperative 
agreements, disputes can still erupt over the very issues on which the 
parties previously agreed.133  Thus, cooperation succeeds only to the ex-
 
 130. Bldg. Erection Servs. Co. v. Am. Bldgs. Co., No. 09-2104-CM-DJW, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 2625, at *4–5 (D. Kan. Jan. 13, 2010). 
 131. See, e.g., Susquehanna Commer. Fin., Inc. v. Vascular Res., Inc., No. 1:09-CV-
2012, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127125, at *40 (M.D. Pa., Dec. 1, 2010) (declaring that 
courts generally refer to The Sedona Principles and other Sedona Conference publications 
as “the leading authorities on electronic document retrieval and production”); DeGeer v. 
Gillis, 755 F. Supp. 2d 909, 918 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (endorsing the Cooperation Proclamation 
and its “call for ‘cooperative, collaborative, [and] transparent discovery’”); Dunkin’ Do-
nuts Franchised Rests. LLC v. Grand Cent. Donuts, Inc., No. CV 2007-
4027(ENV)(MDG), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52261, at *14–15 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2009) 
(noting that the Cooperation Proclamation “recommends that parties cooperate to resolve 
discovery disputes in order to reduce the rising costs associated with such disputes”); 
Ford Motor Co. v. Edgewood Props. Inc., 257 F.R.D. 418, 424–26 (D.N.J. 2009) (deny-
ing a motion to compel re-production of documents in native format, and citing numer-
ous cases declaring the Sedona Conference publications to be “the leading authorities on 
electronic document retrieval and production” while also admonishing the defendant to 
address such issues early in litigation, through an “explicit agreement between the parties 
as to production”). 
 132. See Lee & Withers, supra note 17, at 207  (finding that 71.4% of surveyed magi-
strate judges reported that the 2006 amendment to Rule 26(f) was at least somewhat ef-
fective in “making the conduct of Rule 16(b) pretrial conferences more effective,” 70.5% 
reported it as at least somewhat effective in “encourage[ing] more cooperation,” and 
61.1% reported it as at least somewhat effective in “reduc[ing] the number of e-discovery 
disputes” decided by survey participants). 
 133. See In re Classicstar Mare Lease Litig., No. 5:07-cv-353-JMH, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 9750, at *26 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 2, 2009) (enforcing parties’ agreement to produce ESI 
in native format); Oracle USA, Inc. v. SAP AG, 264 F.R.D. 541, 556–57 (N.D. Cal. 2009) 
(declining to permit discovery of expanded damages claims, given that the parties had, at 
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tent that parties are able to find and maintain common grounds on dis-
covery issues.  Once parties lose such footing, the benefits of coopera-
tion fall away and the burdens of e-discovery return.134  However, prin-
ciples of proportionality in discovery—which the 2006 Amendments 
both incorporated and emphasized—help to fill in the gap left when co-
operation fails,135 and more importantly, help prevent such gaps from 
forming in the first instance. 
ii. Proportionality under the 2006 Amendments 
As hard as it may be for younger lawyers to believe, the scope of 
discovery allowed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was sub-
stantially broader in the past than it is today.  Prior to 1983, Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26 placed no significant limitations on the scope 
of discovery absent a protective order.136  In 1983, however, the Federal 
Rules Committee substantially revised the rule “to deal with the problem 
of over-discovery” and to “guard against redundant or disproportionate 
discovery by giving the court authority to reduce the amount of discov-
ery that may be directed to matters that are otherwise proper subjects of 
inquiry.”137  The rule was expanded in 1993 out of recognition that—
even then—”[t]he information explosion of recent decades ha[d] greatly 
increased both the potential cost of wide-ranging discovery and the po-
tential for discovery to be used as an instrument for delay or oppres-
sion.”138 
Today, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) presumptively al-
lows a litigant to obtain discovery on “any nonprivileged matter that is 
 
the outset of the case, agreed to direct search terms to a narrower set of damage theo-
ries). 
 134. See, e.g., McNulty v. Reddy Ice Holdings, Inc., 271 F.R.D. 569, 571 (noting that 
while both parties “claim[ed] the high ground on willingness to cooperate in electronic 
discovery, . . . apparently no cooperation [had] occurred,” and the court was therefore 
forced to order parties to meet and confer). 
 135. See, e.g., Barrera v. Boughton, No. 3:07cv1436(RNC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
103491, at *8–12 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2010) (ordering discovery of the electronically 
stored documents of three custodians from a proposed list of forty). 
 136. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (Subdivision (a) of the Advisory Committee’s notes on 
1983 amendments) (“The deletion of the last sentence of Rule 26(a)(1), which provided 
that unless the court ordered otherwise under Rule 26(c) ‘the frequency of use’ of the 
various discovery methods was not to be limited, is an attempt to address the problem of 
duplicative, redundant, and excessive discovery and to reduce it.”). 
 137. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (Subdivision (b) of the Advisory Committee’s note on 1983 
amendments). 
 138. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (Subdivision (b) of the Advisory Committee’s note on 1993 
amendments). 
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relevant to any party’s claim or defense.”139  However, as a result of the 
1983 and 1993 amendments, Rule 26(b)(2) tempers the breadth of dis-
covery through proportionality principles that allow a court to limit dis-
covery to include only that information that is truly necessary and rele-
vant to the resolution of a given dispute.140  Specifically, Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C) requires a court to  
[L]imit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed . . . if it 
determines that: 
(i)  the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or 
can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less 
burdensome, or less expensive; 
(ii)  the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the 
information by discovery in the action; or 
(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its like-
ly benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, 
the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, 
and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.141   
The significance of this rule—particularly since the advent of elec-
tronic discovery—cannot be understated because it allows a court to 
limit or prevent discovery based on its own subjective analysis of various 
exigent circumstances surrounding the case.142 For example, a court can 
preclude a party from requesting any further documents on a given sub-
ject if it determines that the party has—or should have—already ob-
tained sufficient information on the subject in discovery.143  Similarly, a 
court can limit a party’s document requests to a specific period of time 
or specific individuals if it determines that a broader scope of discovery 
would not serve “the needs of the case,”144 is not justified based on “the 
amount in controversy,”145 or would not be appropriate given “the par-
 
 139. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
 140. Nestle Foods Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 135 F.R.D. 101, 107 (D.N.J. 1990) 
(recognizing that Rule 26(b)(2) “allow[s] the court to proportion discovery, even though 
it may be relevant”). 
 141. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 
 142. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2). 
 143. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(ii) (requiring the court to limit discovery where “the 
party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information”). 
 144. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii); see also Barrera v. Boughton, No. 
3:07cv1436(RNC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103491, at *8–12 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2010) 
(limiting the time and scope of an initial ESI search). 
 145. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). 
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ties’ resources.”146  The fundamental power of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) lies in 
the fact that it “allow[s] the court to proportion discovery, even though it 
may be relevant” and would be discoverable notwithstanding the court’s 
subjective analysis.147 
Perhaps the only flaw in this proportionality framework is the fact 
that Rule 26(b)(2)(C) places the onus of enforcement on the court with-
out creating any new rights or obligations for litigants.148  This creates a 
structural dynamic where discovery can be limited under this rule, but 
where parties need not alter their discovery conduct until the court has 
actively inserted itself into the process and imposed limitations.  Histori-
cally, this fact limited the effectiveness of this rule because courts were 
reluctant to exercise the full scope of their discretion under Rule 
26(b)(2)(C).149  One likely explanation for this is that, in the prior age of 
pure paper discovery, proportionality had less salience than today be-
cause the differing burdens associated with broad and narrow discovery 
requests were generally not of a sufficient magnitude to spur action by 
courts or litigants.  A party may have grumbled over the expenses asso-
ciated with searching for and producing marginally relevant paper doc-
uments, but the volume of such documents rarely escalated to the point 
where discovery threatened to become “the sideshow which eclipse[d] 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. Nestle Foods Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 135 F.R.D. 101, 107 (D.N.J. 1990) 
(emphasis added); see also Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., No. 88-9752, 
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12959, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1991) (“Even were I to find some 
remote relevance in the . . . [discovery] requests, the 1983 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) 
of the Federal Rules emphasized that discovery must be proportional, as well as relevant 
to the lawsuit and must be tailored to the case at hand.”). 
 148. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (Subdivision (b) of Advisory Committee’s notes on 1983 
amendments) (“The new sentence is intended to encourage judges to be more aggressive 
in identifying and discouraging discovery overuse.” (emphasis added)). 
 149. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (Subdivision (b)(1) of Advisory Committee’s notes on 2000 
amendments) (“The Committee has been told repeatedly that courts have not imple-
mented these limitations with the vigor that was contemplated.”).  But see Leksi, Inc. v. 
Fed. Ins. Co., 129 F.R.D. 99, 106 (D.N.J. 1989).  A federal district court in New Jersey 
cited Rule 26(b) to support a holding that: 
  The information which [the plaintiff] seeks . . . is disproportionate to the 
declaratory judgment action it has filed. To compel the production of the [in-
formation would] . . . not only involve[] enormous inconvenience and man-
agement difficulties, but [would] also entail[] a frightening potential for 
spawning unbearable side litigation which, in [the court’s] view, [would] de-
feat[] the purpose and spirit of the discovery rules themselves. 
Id. 
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the circus.”150  With the advent of e-discovery, this calculus fundamen-
tally changed,151 and as a result, the concept of proportionality in discov-
ery has taken on much greater importance.152   
In 2006, the Federal Rules Committee amended Rule 26 to add sub-
section (b)(2)(B), which states that a party “need not provide discovery 
of electronically stored information [that is] not reasonably accessible 
because of undue burden or cost” provided, however, that such party has 
the burden of demonstrating that the ESI is, in fact, not reasonably ac-
cessible for these reasons.153  The new rule is specifically “designed to 
address issues raised by difficulties in locating, retrieving, and providing 
discovery of some electronically stored information,”154 and for the first 
time, allows a party responding to discovery to proportion the scope of 
its responses, at least in the first instance.  This new rule rests on the 
recognition that the burdens caused by the volume155 or geographic dis-
persion156 of ESI may, in many instances, be disproportionate to the val-
ue of that ESI to the litigation,157 and that, often, “information contained 
on easily accessed sources . . . may be all that is reasonably useful or ne-
cessary for the litigation.”158   
Although the Federal Rules Committee recognized the need to give 
parties the ability to proportion the discovery of ESI, it also recognized 
that granting such power carried a significant risk of abuse and, there-
 
 150. Tech. Sales Assocs. v. Ohio Star Forge Co., Nos. 07-11745, 08-13365, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 53711, at *4 (E.D. Mich. May 1, 2009). 
 151. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 22–24. 
 152. See, e.g., Adams v. United States, No. 4:CV 03-49-BLW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
135726, at *14–15 (D. Idaho Dec. 22, 2010) (illustrating a court that weighed the bur-
den of proposed discovery against its likely benefit, and exercising discretion under Rule 
26(b)(2)(C)(iii) to deny a party’s motion to compel); Araiza v. Mecham, No. CV10-0188 
PHX DGC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127420, at *3–4 (D. Ariz. Dec. 1, 2010) (noting that 
the court limited discovery as required by Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) “to ensure that it was 
proportional to the modest amount at issue in [the] case”). 
 153. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (limiting Rule 26(b)(1)).  Rule 26(b)(1) is further 
limited by subsection (b)(2)(C), which, for instance, permits a court to limit discovery 
where the burden of such discovery would outweigh its likely benefit.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(b)(2)(C)(iii). 
 154. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (Subdivision (b)(2) of the advisory committee’s notes 
on 2006 amendments). 
 155. See The Sedona Principles, supra note 59, at 4 (sharing statistics concerning the 
proliferation of electronically stored information). 
 156. Id. at 6, 17. 
 157. Id. at 17. 
 158. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 31 (noting that a “two-tier practice,” whe-
reby the parties first examine easily-accessed sources before moving on to more difficult-
to-access sources, may be appropriate in some cases). 
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fore, took steps to mitigate this danger through the commentary to Rule 
26(b)(2)(B).159  Prior to the 2006 Amendments, many litigants adopted 
the practice of responding to electronic discovery requests simply by de-
clining to produce ESI that was characterized as “difficult to access.”160  
When expanding the role of proportionality under Rule 26(b)(2) in 
2006, the Federal Rules Committee clarified that this new ability to limit 
the scope of discovery on accessibility grounds only applied when ESI is 
“difficult to access . . . for all purposes.”161  In other words, Rule 
26(b)(2)(B) allows a party to proportion its production of ESI only when 
the burden or cost of retrieval truly outweighs the value of the informa-
tion to the litigation,162 and, even then, allows the opposing party to ob-
tain the ESI when necessary. 163   
 
Regarding the 2006 amendments, the Federal Rules Committee suggested: 
Under this rule, a responding party should produce electronically stored in-
formation that is relevant, not privileged, and reasonably accessible, subject to 
the (b)(2)(C) limitations that apply to all discovery. The responding party 
must also identify, by category or type, the sources containing potentially res-
ponsive information that it is neither searching nor producing. The identifica-
tion should, to the extent possible, provide enough detail to enable the request-
ing party to evaluate the burdens and costs of providing the discovery and the 
likelihood of finding responsive information on the identified sources. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (Subdivision (b)(2) of Advisory Committee’s notes on 2006 
amendments). 
 160. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 31. 
 161. Id. at 32 (emphasis added). 
 162. Daniel B. Garrie, et al., Hiding the Inaccessible Truth: Amending the Federal Rules 
to Accommodate Electronic Discovery, 25 REV. LITIG. 115, 118–19, 125, 126 (2006) (not-
ing that Rule 26(b)(2)(B) does not allow litigants simply to “re-characterize their data by 
saving it in inaccessible forms to eliminate discovery production obligations while main-
taining access to their data”); see also Rebecca Rockwood, Comment, Shifting Burdens and 
Concealing Electronic Evidence: Discovery in the Digital Era, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 16, ¶ 34 
(2006) (considering how Rule 26(b)(2)(B) and Rule 37(f) work together).  Rockwood 
observes that: 
  The combined effect of proposed Rules 26(b)(2)(B) and 37(f) is that com-
panies can get the ‘benefits of a data deletion policy’ without actually deleting 
anything.  Although these new rules will help corporate defendants get through 
the litigation process without incurring a great deal of expense, it will also al-
low them more room to conceal important files and electronic documents. In 
the future, technically savvy defendants will have a distinct advantage in evad-
ing discovery of potentially damaging documents. In many cases, this could 
change the entire outcome of the litigation. 
Id. 
 163. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) (Subdivision (b)(2) of Advisory Committee’s notes on 
2006 amendments) (indicating that inaccessibility can be overcome by a showing of 
good cause). The committee explained that: 
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When analyzing accessibility objections under the 2006 Amend-
ments, courts apply proportionality principles in a variety of ways to en-
sure that discovery “is reasonable and appropriate to the dispute at hand 
while not imposing excessive burdens and costs on litigation and the 
court.”164  In some cases, courts have denied a party’s request for ESI out-
right where the circumstances of the case did not justify the burden of 
production or the party failed to show good cause.165  In other instances, 
courts have substantially narrowed the scope of e-discovery to ensure 
that the associated burdens corresponded to the facts of the case,166 in 
some instances carefully distinguishing between accessible and inaccess-
ible ESI sources.167  In still other matters, courts have used proportionali-
ty principles to limit the scope of proposed ESI protocols to specific cus-
 
[o]nce it is shown that a source of electronically stored information is not rea-
sonably accessible, the requesting party may still obtain discovery by showing 
good cause, considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) that balance the 
costs and potential benefits of discovery.  The decision whether to require a 
responding party to search for and produce information that is not reasonably 
accessible depends not only on the burdens and costs of doing so, but also on 
whether those burdens and costs can be justified in the circumstances of the 
case. 
Id. 
 164. The Sedona Principles, supra note 59, at iii.  The Sedona Conference Working 
Group has stated that, in “drafting the [Sedona] principles and commentary, [they] tried 
to keep in mind the ‘rule of reasonableness,’” which is “embodied in [Federal] Rules 1 
(courts should secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of all matters) and 
26(b)(2) (proportionality test of burden, cost, and need).”  Id. 
 165. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Torres v. Gov’t Dev. Bank of P.R., 265 F.R.D. 40, 44 (D.P.R. 
2010) (denying a party’s request for three years’ worth of e-mails on the grounds that ESI 
was “not reasonably accessible because of the undue burden and cost”); BBVA Compass 
Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Olson, No. 10-cv-00528-WYD-KLM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111633, 
at *10 (D. Colo. Oct. 12, 2010) (finding that Plaintiff’s affidavit, which “attests that 
Plaintiff [would] expend between 200 and 400 hours to compile the requested files” suf-
ficiently demonstrated Plaintiff’s claim of undue burden, and finding Defendant’s need 
insufficient to overcome such burden); Cartel Asset Mgmt. v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 01-
cv-01644-REB-CBS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17857, at *45–46 (D. Colo. Feb. 8, 2010) 
(calling the defendants’ argument the “e-discovery equivalent of an unsubstantiated claim 
that the ‘sky is falling’”). 
 166. See, e.g., Calixto v. Watson Bowman Acme Corp., No. 07-60077, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 111659, at *30–35 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 2009) (ordering defendant to restore and 
search one backup tape, rather than all of its backup tapes as plaintiff requested). 
 167. Johnson v. Neiman, No. 4:09CV00689 AGF, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110496, at 
*4–5 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 18, 2010) (holding that information stored on 5,880 backup tapes 
was inaccessible based on estimated time and cost of restoring information); Helmert v. 
Butterball, LLC, No. 4:08CV00342 JLH, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60777, at *26 (E.D. Ark. 
May 27, 2010) (allowing discovery of ESI housed on laptops and hard drives, but not ESI 
located on backup tapes). 
29
Vick and Magnuson: The Promise of a Cooperative and Proportional Discovery Process i
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2012
VICK FINAL 3/23/2012  2:25 PM 
262 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:233 
todians,168 date ranges,169 and search terms most likely to yield relevant 
information.170  More recently, courts have begun to show an increased 
willingness to proportion e-discovery through iterative search and sam-
pling techniques in which a small quantity of ESI is searched in order to 
determine whether further and broader searches are justified.171  
Similar to its reliance on the Cooperation Proclamation when ad-
dressing issues of cooperation under the 2006 Amendments, the federal 
judiciary has begun to rely on The Sedona Conference’s Commentary on 
Proportionality in Electronic Discovery172 (Commentary on Proportionality) 
when addressing issues of proportionality.  Issued in late 2010, the 
Commentary on Proportionality sets forth and discusses six principles 
“to guide courts, attorneys, and parties” when confronting questions re-
garding the proportionality of discovery.173  The six principles are: 
1.  The burdens and costs of preservation of potentially relevant infor-
mation should be weighed against the potential value and uniqueness of 
the information when determining the appropriate scope of preservation. 
 
 168. Willnerd v. Sybase, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-500-BLW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121658, at 
*8–9 (D. Idaho Nov. 16, 2010) (characterizing a request for search of thirty custodians’ 
e-mails as “the proverbial fishing expedition” and, applying proportionality standards, to 
limit the search to a single custodian). 
 169. United Cent. Bank v. Kanan Fashions, Inc., No. 10 C 331, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
83700, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2010) (adopting date ranges proposed by Plaintiff for 
ESI search “given the cost of ESI and minimal relevance of any documents outside of 
[the] date range”). 
 170. See, e.g., Barrera v. Boughton, No. 3:07cv1436(RNC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
103491, at *12–13 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2010) (rejecting a party’s proposed protocol that 
sought search of ESI from forty custodians over six-year period in favor of limited proto-
col involving search of three custodians over three-year period); Edelen v. Campbell 
Soup Co., 265 F.R.D. 676, 684–85 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (rejecting protocol proposed by a 
requesting party that would have searched fifty-five custodians over a three-year period 
using fifty search terms in favor of a narrower protocol proposed by the party responding 
to discovery). 
 171. See, e.g., Barrera, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103491, at *12; Phillip M. Adams & As-
soc., LLC v. Fujitsu Ltd., No. 1:05-CV-64, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45576, at *24–25 (D. 
Utah May 10, 2010) (permitting a limited search of a sampling of Plaintiff’s old comput-
ers, with the possibility of “further discovery”); see also Makrakis v. DeMelis, No. 09-706-
C, 2010 Mass. Super. LEXIS 223, at *6–7 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 13, 2010) (utilizing iter-
ative searching under state procedural rules). 
 172. The Sedona Conference, Commentary on Proportionality in Electronic Discovery, 
11 SEDONA CONF. J. 289 (2010), available at 
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/Proportionality2010.pdf [herei-
nafter Commentary on Proportionality]. 
 173. Id. at 291. 
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2.  Discovery should generally be obtained from the most convenient, 
least burdensome, and least expensive sources. 
3.  Undue burden, expense, or delay resulting from a party’s action or 
inaction should be weighed against that party. 
4.  Extrinsic information and sampling may assist in the analysis of 
whether requested discovery is sufficiently important to warrant the po-
tential burden or expense of its production. 
5.  Nonmonetary factors should be considered when evaluating the bur-
dens and benefits of discovery. 
6. Technologies to reduce cost and burden should be considered in the 
proportionality analysis.174  
Within months of its initial publication, the Northern District of Il-
linois had cited the Commentary on Proportionality, informing parties—
who had been involved in litigation for six years, but were just reaching 
the point of discovery—of its authority to limit discovery based on prin-
ciples of proportionality in what appeared to be a clear attempt to steer 
the parties away from misuse of the discovery process.175  More recently, 
the District of Minnesota relied on the Commentary on Proportionality 
when rejecting a party’s assertion that ESI was inaccessible and compel-
ling that party to produce the ESI, in part, because “the burden and ex-
pense of this discovery was self-inflicted.”176  As with its frequent re-
liance on the Cooperation Proclamation, the federal judiciary’s growing 
embrace of the Commentary on Proportionality reflects the extent to 
which courts have come to recognize how they can use the proportional-
ity principles in Rule 26(b) to shape and focus the process of electronic 
discovery.   
The power of these principles to reduce the burdens of electronic 
discovery is manifest from the cases in which courts have actively ap-
 
 174. Id. 
 175. Tamburo v. Dworkin, No. 04 C 3317, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121510, at *7 (N.D. 
Ill. Nov. 17, 2010) (“The ‘metrics’ set forth in Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) provide courts signif-
icant flexibility and discretion to assess the circumstances of the case and limit discovery 
accordingly to ensure that the scope and duration of discovery is reasonably proportional 
to the value of the requested information, the needs of the case, and the parties’ re-
sources.” (quoting Commentary on Proportionality, supra note 172, at 294) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)). 
 176. Escamilla v. SMS Holdings Corp., No. 09-2120 ADM/JSM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
122165, at *16–17 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2011) (“In assessing whether a particular discov-
ery request or requirement is unduly burdensome or expensive, a court should consider 
the extent to which the claimed burden expense grow[s] out of the responding party’s 
action or inaction.” (citing the Commentary on Proportionality, supra note 172, at 294)). 
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plied them.  For example, in one recent case, the plaintiff sought pro-
duction of ESI from forty custodians over a six year period using eighty 
search terms.177  After considering the defendants’ objection that the cost 
of such production would greatly outweigh its benefit to the case, the 
court approved a limited initial sampling of ESI that only covered three 
custodians over a three year period, but did employ the eighty search 
terms proposed by the plaintiff.178  Although the defendant faced the 
possibility of further e-discovery depending on the results of the initial 
phase, the court’s willingness and ability to proportion discovery in this 
manner reduced by 75% the defendants’ estimated costs associated with 
the production.179 
III. ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY IN NORTH CAROLINA 
A. H.B. 380 and the Advent of Formal Electronic Discovery Rules in North 
Carolina 
Although state courts in North Carolina have confronted the same 
e-discovery-related issues that prompted the Federal Rules Committee to 
propose the 2006 Amendments,180 until passage of H.B. 380 in 2011, the 
State lacked a set of generally-applicable procedural rules181 to govern 
the discovery of ESI.182  As a result, state court litigants and judges have 
had to grapple with the complexities of e-discovery under prior versions 
 
 177. Barrera v. Boughton, No. 3:07cv1436(RNC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103491, at 
*8–12 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2010). 
 178. Id. 
 179. See id. (noting that the estimated cost of full search was $60,000, while estimated 
cost of limited search was between $13,000 and $15,000). 
 180. Bank of Am. Corp. v. SR Int’l Bus. Ins. Co., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *7–10 
(N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2006). 
 181. See id.  The North Carolina Business Court had adopted a limited set of rules re-
lated to e-discovery, but the Honorable Ben F. Tennille, Chief Special Superior Court 
Judge for Complex Business Cases, recognized that development of a more comprehen-
sive set of e-discovery rules would require legislative action.  Id. at *9–10. 
 182. Id. (“Were it necessary to adopt a separate test specifically for electronic discov-
ery, it would not be the province of this Court to do so.  It is for the appellate courts and 
the Legislature to set forth such a test.”); Kara A. Millonzi, E-Discovery In North Carolina: 
A Review of the 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 2008 Pro-
posed Amendments to the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure 2 (draft) (March 26, 
2009) available at http://www.sog.unc.edu/programs/attorneyconferences/ 
docs/2009-city%20winter-millonzi-ediscovery%20memo.pdf. 
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of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure183 and informal guide-
lines promulgated by the Conference of Chief Justices.184  During this 
time, e-discovery issues arose,185 but the State courts did not experience 
any ESI-related scenarios of a magnitude similar to those confronted by 
the federal courts prior to the adoption of the 2006 Amendments.186 
Regardless, based on the changes that had taken place on the federal 
level, the North Carolina Bar Association’s Litigation Section formed an 
E-Discovery Committee during its 2007–2008 term to study the issue 
and examine possible changes to the North Carolina Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure.187  The E-Discovery Committee was specifically tasked with pro-
posing “a mechanism for discovery of ESI during litigation in our state 
courts” and a “means to alleviate, to the extent possible, the difficulties 
demonstrated in the early interpretations of the [2006 Amendments].”188  
Accordingly, the committee eventually proposed a discrete set of 
amendments to North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure 16, 26, 33, 34, 
37, and 45.189  Eschewing a more complicated or novel scheme, the E-
Discovery Committee followed the federal approach and largely pat-
terned the rule changes in H.B. 380 after the 2006 Amendments with on-
ly a handful of state-specific alterations.190 
Perhaps most significantly, the E-Discovery Committee emphasized 
the fact that “practical application of the federal rules amendments [had 
shown] the great value of pre-discovery dialogue among the parties or 
 
 183. Analog Devices, Inc. v. Michalski, 01 CVS 10614, 2006 NCBC LEXIS 16, at *39–
41 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2006) (analyzing a claim that production of electronic in-
formation poses an undue burden on a party under Rule 26(b)(2) proportionality fac-
tors). 
 184. Bank of Am. Corp., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *9–10 (denying electronic discovery 
request of a non-party as unduly burdensome after considering, among other things, the 
factors set forth in the Conference of Chief Justices, Guidelines for State Trial Courts Re-
garding Discovery of Electronically-Stored Information); see also CONF. OF CHIEF 
JUSTICES, supra note 12. 
 185. See generally Bank of Am. Corp., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *9–10; Analog Devices, 
Inc., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 16. 
 186. See generally Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 187. NORTH CAROLINA BAR ASSOCIATION LITIGATION SECTION E-DISCOVERY COMMITTEE, 
PROPOSED AMENDED NORTH CAROLINA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: RULES 16, 26, 33, 34, 37 
AND 45: OVERVIEW 1 (2010), [hereinafter “E-DISCOVERY COMM. OVERVIEW”] available at  
http://www.ncbar.org/media/11074033/NCROCPAmendEDiscovery.pdf . 
 188. E-DISCOVERY COMM. REPORT, supra note 19, at 1–2. 
 189. E-DISCOVERY COMM. OVERVIEW, supra note 187, at 1–2. 
 190. See E-DISCOVERY COMM. REPORT, supra note 19, at 1 (noting that the proposed 
rules “follow[] the concepts of the federal rules”). 
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their attorneys, particularly with regard to discovery of ESI.”191  As a re-
sult, the committee specifically designed the new rules to “encourage 
and facilitate that dialogue[] to the greatest extent possible short of 
mandating a conference in every civil matter,” and to “create a frame-
work for the court and the litigants to [use in] address[ing] the methods, 
mechanisms, and potential costs of discovery of ESI.”192  The specific 
rule changes that make up this framework are described below.193 
 
• Rule 16—Court-Ordered Discovery Scheduling Conference 
 
As part of an overall scheme to bring greater control to the discov-
ery process, H.B. 380 amended Rule 16 to increase the effectiveness of 
court-ordered pre-trial scheduling conferences.  While the amended rule 
does not require a court to conduct a discovery scheduling conference in 
every case, if a court exercises its discretion to hold such a conference, 
Rule 16(a) now requires it to enter an order memorializing what took 
place, including any agreements reached by the parties that relate to dis-
covery issues.194  
 
• Rule 26(b)(1)—Scope of Discovery/Metadata 
 
As part of the “core of the e-discovery framework,”195 H.B. 380 
amended Rule 26(b)(1) to add ESI as a category of discoverable informa-
tion.196  In recognition of the fact that ESI often contains relevant infor-
mation that is buried or hidden in digital code (otherwise known as “me-
tadata”), H.B. 380 expanded the definition of ESI “to include not only the 
information contained on the screen view of [a] file[,] but also reasona-
bly accessible metadata that reflect such key information as date sent, 
date received, author, and recipients.”197  However, the E-Discovery 
Committee drafted the amended rule “to focus electronic discovery on 
 
 191. Id. at 2. 
 192. Id. 
 193. The E-Discovery Committee also made various technical changes to the rules at 
issue, such as to incorporate gender neutrality.  Id. at 1.  This article does not review or 
address these technical changes. 
 194. H.B. 380, Gen. Assem., 2011–2012 Sess. (N.C. 2011); E-DISCOVERY COMM. 
REPORT, supra note 19, at 2. 
 195. E-DISCOVERY COMM. REPORT, supra note 19, at 2. 
 196. H.B. 380, Gen. Assem., 2011–2012 Sess. (N.C. 2011); E-DISCOVERY COMM. 
REPORT, supra note 19, at 2. 
 197. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(1) cmt. to amendment (2011). 
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the kinds of metadata that will be relevant in most cases” by specifically 
excluding other types of metadata from the definition of ESI and “mak-
ing that metadata not subject to discovery unless the parties agree . . . or 
the court orders disclosure.”198  
 
• Rule 26(b)(2)—Proportionality of Discovery 
 
Although H.B. 380 did not alter Rule 26(b)(2) in any meaningful 
way,199 the fact that the legislation retained the proportionality provision 
contained in this rule is, as discussed in more detail below, significant to 
the overall effectiveness of the legislation in addressing the burdens of e-
discovery.  As is relevant here, Rule 26(b)(2) continues to require a court 
to limit the “frequency or extent” of discovery when it “is unduly bur-
densome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the 
amount in controversy, limitations on the parties’ resources, and the im-
portance of the issues at stake in the litigation.”200  Put differently, Rule 
26(b)(2) mandates that a court ensure that a party’s use of discovery is 
proportional to the needs of the case.201 
 
• Rules 26(b)(3) and 34(b)—Accessibility Limitations on  
 Discovery of ESI 
 
Amended Rules 26(b)(3) and 34(b) allow a party to resist discovery 
of ESI by interposing an objection that the ESI sought is “not reasonably 
accessible because of undue burden or cost,” or that the format of the re-
quested ESI production is objectionable.202  Where such an objection is 
raised, Rules 26(c) and 37(a)(2) clarify that the burden rests with the 
objecting party to prove that the information is, in fact, not reasonably 
accessible, and that, upon a showing of good cause, a court can order 
production even where the objecting party carries this burden.203 
 
 
 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(2) cmt. to amendment (2011). 
 200. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(2). 
 201. Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594, 600 (E.D. 
Wis. 2004) (discussing the comparable proportionality mandate contained in FED. R. 
CIV. P. 26(b)); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 202. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rules 26(b)(3), 34(b). 
 203. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(c) cmt. to amendment (2011), Rule 37(a)(2) cmt. to amend-
ment (2011). 
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• Rule 26(b)(3)—Allocation of E-Discovery Costs 
 
Under Rule 26(b)(3), a court now has the express authority to allo-
cate the costs of e-discovery between the parties.204  Significantly, the 
amended rule does not condition the court’s authority to make such an 
allocation on a party first moving for or otherwise requesting an alloca-
tion of costs.205 
 
• Rule 26(b)(7)—The Discovery of Privileged Documents 
 
H.B. 380 added a new Rule 26(b)(7) to incorporate two significant 
privilege-related protections.206  Under Rule 26(b)(7)(a), a party with-
holding documents on the basis of privilege must now expressly make 
the claim of privilege and must provide sufficient information about the 
withheld documents to allow the receiving party to assess fully the 
claim.207  Under Rule 26(b)(7)(b), a party can mitigate the inadvertent 
production of privileged information by providing notice to the receiv-
ing party, who then is obligated to return, sequester, or destroy the in-
formation in question, though the party can submit the information to 
the court to review the claim of privilege.208  
 
• Rule 26(f)—Discovery Scheduling Conferences 
 
One of the most significant and important changes incorporated in 
H.B. 380 was the creation of a new discovery scheduling conference, or 
“meet and confer” process.  Under amended Rule 26(f), any party in-
volved in civil litigation can request a discovery scheduling conference 
and, after such a request is made, the opposing party is required to at-
tend.209  During the “meet and confer,” parties are required to “consider 
the nature and basis of the parties’ claims and defenses and the possibili-
ties for promptly settling or resolving the case and . . . discuss the prepa-
 
 204. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(3) cmt. to amendment (2011) (noting that Rule 26(b)(3) 
“specifically recognizes the authority of the court to specify conditions for electronic dis-
covery, including allocation of the costs of that discovery”). 
 205. See id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(3). 
 206. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(7) cmt. to amendment (2011). 
 207. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(7)(a). 
 208. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(7)(b). 
 209. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(f). 
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ration of a discovery plan”210 that includes “a statement of the issues as 
they then appear.”211 
The new rule specifically encourages the parties to consider, where 
appropriate, (a) the preservation of ESI;212 (b) “the media form, format, 
or procedures by which [ESI] will be produced;”213 (c) “the allocation of 
the costs of preservation, production, and, if necessary, restoration, of 
[ESI];”214 (d) “the method for asserting or preserving claims of privilege 
or of protection of the information as trial-preparation materials if differ-
ent from that provided in [Rule 26(b)(7)];”215 (e) “the method for assert-
ing or preserving confidentiality and proprietary status” of documents or 
ESI;216 (f) “any limitations proposed to be placed on discovery, including, 
if appropriate under the circumstances of the case, that discovery be 
conducted in phases or be limited to or focused on particular issues;”217 
and (g) any agreements between the parties to limit discovery through 
the use of a protective order under Rule 26(c).218  After the conference is 
held, the parties must either submit a joint discovery plan to the court if 
they reach agreement on all issues or separate plans if they cannot.219  
Thereafter, Rule 26(f) requires the court to enter a discovery scheduling 
order upon motion of either party.220 
The commentary to Rule 26(f) explicitly encourages parties to delay 
the discovery scheduling conference “until all parties can become suffi-
ciently familiar with the issues arising in the action and the potential 
sources of discovery information” to ensure that the “discovery meeting 
will be meaningful, beneficial, and productive.”221  Additionally, the 
commentary incorporates by reference the commentary to the 2006 
amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f), and advises that it 
“can provide guidance regarding discovery of electronically stored in-
formation where applicable.”222  This decision on the part of the E-
Discovery Committee is particularly significant because of the emphasis 
 
 210. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(f)(2)(i)–(ii). 
 211. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(f)(3)(i). 
 212. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(f)(3)(iii). 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(f)(3)(iv). 
 218. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(f)(3)(vi). 
 219. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(f)(2). 
 220. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(f)(4). 
 221. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(f) cmt. to amendment (2011). 
 222. Id. 
37
Vick and Magnuson: The Promise of a Cooperative and Proportional Discovery Process i
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2012
VICK FINAL 3/23/2012  2:25 PM 
270 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:233 
that the commentary to Federal Rule 26(f) places on engagement be-
tween the parties on the issue of e-discovery and the benefits that can be 
achieved through cooperative agreements regarding issues, such as pre-
servation and privilege, that have proved so problematic in e-discovery 
practice.223 
 
• Rule 33(c)—Responding to Interrogatories Using Business  
 Records 
 
H.B. 380 made a slight change to Rule 33(c) to clarify that a party 
can now respond to an interrogatory by producing and referring to ESI 
where “the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer is substantially 
the same for the party serving the interrogatory as for the party 
served.”224  However, Rule 33(c) now requires a party who relies on 
business records or ESI in this manner to provide “sufficient detail to 
permit the interrogating party to locate and to identify, as readily as can 
the party served, the records from which the answer may be ascer-
tained,”225 and the commentary to the amendments warn that a party in-
voking this provision “may be required to provide direct access to its 
electronic information system . . . if . . . necessary to afford the request-
ing party an adequate opportunity to derive or ascertain the answer to 
the interrogatory.”226 
 
• Rule 34(a)—Requests for Production of ESI 
 
H.B. 380 revised Rule 34(a) to include ESI within the scope of in-
formation of which a party can request production in discovery.227  It is 
significant to note that H.B. 380 retained the language that allows a party 
to request an opportunity to “test or sample” information that falls with-
in the scope of Rule 34(a).228  By expanding the scope of this rule to en-
compass ESI while simultaneously retaining the “test and sample” provi-
sion, H.B. 380 expressly allows a party to conduct a forensic 
examination of an ESI repository (i.e., hard drive, thumb drive, etc.) 
where appropriate. 
 
 
 223. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (Advisory Committee’s note on 2006 amendments). 
 224. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 33(c). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 33(c) cmt. to amendment (2011). 
 227. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 34(a) cmt. to amendment (2011). 
 228. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 34(a)(i). 
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• Rule 34(b)—Form of Production of ESI 
 
H.B. 380 also amended Rule 34(b) in two significant ways.  First, a 
party must produce ESI “as [it is] kept in the usual course of business or 
must organize and label [it] to correspond to the categories in the dis-
covery request.”229  By incorporating this mandate, Rule 34(b) seeks “to 
protect against deliberate or inadvertent production in ways that raise 
unnecessary obstacles for the requesting party.”230  Put differently, this 
“provision prohibits ‘simply dumping large quantities of unrequested 
material[] onto [a] discover[y] party along with the items actually 
sought.’”231  Second, the amended rule allows the party requesting dis-
covery to specify the form in which the responding party should pro-
duce ESI and, in the absence of such a specification, allows the respond-
ing party to produce ESI in any “reasonably usable form,” but does not 
require production in more than one form.232  The commentary to the 
amendments further clarifies that it is inappropriate for a party to with-
hold production based on an objection to the requested form of produc-
tion of ESI and that, in such situation, the objecting party “must propose 
an alternative form or forms” of production.233 
 
• Rule 37(c)—Safe Harbor for the Loss of ESI under Certain  
 Circumstances 
 
Amended Rule 37(c) incorporates a safe harbor protection that re-
lates to a litigant’s common law duty to preserve relevant information 
when litigation arises or is reasonably anticipated to arise.234  Under Rule 
37(c), a party is protected from spoliation sanctions—except in excep-
tional circumstances—where ESI that is subject to the preservation duty 
is “lost as a result of routine, good-faith operation of an electronic infor-
 
 229. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 34(b)(1). 
 230. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 34(b) cmt. to amendment (2011). 
 231. S.E.C. v. Colins & Aikman Corp., 256 F.R.D. 403, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (con-
struing the federal counterpart to North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b) (quoting 
8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 2213 (2008))). 
 232. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 34(b). 
 233. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 34(b) cmt. to amendment (2011). 
 234. See Inventory Locator Serv., LLC v. PartsBase, Inc., No. 02-2695-MaV, 2005 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 46252, at *37 n.8 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 19, 2005) (noting relationship between 
duty to preserve and safe-harbor provision in what was then-proposed FED. R. CIV. P. 
37(f)). 
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mation system.”235  This safe harbor does not vitiate a party’s obligation 
to institute preservation measures when a triggering event occurs, but 
recognizes the sometime-mercurial nature of electronic information go-
vernance and provides a modicum of protection where ESI is inadver-
tently lost.236  
 
• Rule 45—Subpoenas Seeking Production of ESI 
 
H.B. 380 made a number of changes to Rule 45 that incorporate ESI 
into the subpoena process.237  These changes largely mirror those to the 
rules that govern discovery between the parties to a lawsuit, and create 
similar substantive rights and obligations for those involved in discovery 
under Rule 45 subpoenas.238  For example, a party can specifically sub-
poena ESI from a non-party239 who can object to the subpoena on 
grounds that the requested ESI is not reasonably accessible.240 
Through these various amendments, the E-Discovery Committee 
designed a general framework to govern the discovery of ESI in state 
court litigation.  When read in isolation or analyzed from a technical 
perspective, these rule changes may seem somewhat modest and largely 
uneventful.  With few exceptions, H.B. 380 does not dramatically change 
the rights and duties of parties engaged in discovery.  However, the 
seeming simplicity of the legislation’s design does not reflect the true 
depth of its impact, as discussed in the following section.  
B. The Impact of H.B. 380 on the Discovery Process in North Carolina 
When summarizing its work, the E-Discovery Committee stated 
that the proposed rules reflected “significant differences” from the 2006 
Amendments and, thus, the prevailing e-discovery rules in the federal 
 
 235. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 37(c); see also id. cmt. to amendment (2011) (clari-
fying that the safe harbor only applies “to information lost due to . . . the ways in which 
[electronic information systems] generally are designed, programmed, and implemented 
to meet the party’s technical and business needs”). 
 236. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 37(c) cmt. to amendment (2011) (“Section (c) is an effort to 
recognize a necessary balance between normal computer system operations and the 
needs of litigation.”). 
 237. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 45 cmt. to amendment (2011) (“Rule 45 is amended to conform 
the provisions for subpoenas to changes in other discovery rules, largely related to dis-
covery of electronically stored information.”). 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 45(a)(1)(b). 
 240. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 45(d)(4). 
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courts.241  Although the committee did not specifically delineate these 
perceived differences, the procedural framework that it created and the 
basic approach that it adopted incorporated perhaps the two most im-
portant principles embodied in the 2006 Amendments: cooperation and 
proportionality.  If actively promoted by the courts and embraced by li-
tigants, these two principles have the potential to shift the discovery 
process in the North Carolina state courts from the current adversarial 
paradigm towards a more efficient and less contentious future.   
i. H.B. 380 Will Promote Greater Communication and Cooperation 
in Discovery 
Prior to H.B. 380, the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure 
created a structurally adversarial paradigm in discovery that did little to 
promote cooperation between the parties.  The rules allowed parties to 
request various types of discovery from one another and imposed vari-
ous penalties on parties who failed to respond to discovery,242 but, ex-
cept in limited circumstances,243 did not require parties ever to engage 
with one another directly on any issue related to discovery unless and 
until a dispute had already developed.244  This lack of structured en-
gagement between the parties created a vacuum in which adversarial ap-
proaches to discovery blossomed.  For example, in one case, a court de-
faulted a defendant who flatly refused to produce certain information 
requested in discovery—even after the court compelled it to do so—on 
grounds that the information did not relate to a claim or defense at issue 
in the case.245  Although one cannot say for certain that engagement be-
tween the parties in that particular matter would have made a difference, 
the disputed issue there is precisely the type that parties can clarify—if 
not resolve entirely—through constructive pre-discovery dialogue.246 
 
 241. E-DISCOVERY COMM. REPORT, supra note 19, at 1. 
 242. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rules 26, 33, 34, and 37 (2009). 
 243. See id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(f1) (requiring discovery scheduling conference in medical 
malpractice action). 
 244. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 37(a)(2) (requiring party to certify that, prior to filing motion to 
compel, it “has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party 
failing to make the discovery in an effort to secure the information or material without 
court action”). 
 245. Kewaunee Scientific Corp. v. E. Scientific Prods., Inc., 471 S.E.2d 451, 451–52 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1996). 
 246. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 26(f)(1)–(3) (2009) (requiring parties to in-
clude a statement of the issues involved in a matter and any limitations on discovery in a 
proposed discovery scheduling submitted to the court following a discovery scheduling 
conference); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 26(f) cmt. to amendment (2011) (encouraging 
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H.B. 380 sets the stage for parties to engage in just such a dialogue 
by creating a new “meet and confer” process under Rule 26(f) that will 
foster constructive engagement between the parties early in a case.247  Al-
though not mandatory in every civil matter, this new process will likely 
occur in a significant percentage of cases—particularly those likely to 
involve substantial e-discovery—given that Rule 26(f) now allows any 
party to obtain the certainty of a discovery scheduling order, but condi-
tions entry of such an order on the parties’ first conducting a “meet and 
confer.”248  This new rule does not—and, indeed, could not—force the 
parties to agree on an overall discovery plan or even a single provision of 
such a plan, but it does require them to talk and, as the federal courts 
have demonstrated, it is this mechanism of engagement that has proven 
so effective at promoting the type of cooperation that prevents certain e-
discovery disputes from developing.249  
Prior to adoption of the 2006 Amendments, the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure had long incorporated a “meet and confer” process un-
der Rule 16 that required the parties to discuss case management and 
discovery scheduling in civil matters,250 but primarily focused on admin-
istrative and ministerial topics, such as how many interrogatories a party 
could serve and the deadline for disclosing experts, rather than more 
substantive issues.251  As a result, initial pre-trial conferences conducted 
under this prior iteration of Rule 16 did not result in parties collectively 
engaging in constructive dialog about their case or individually spending 
time before the conference exploring the full contours of the discovery 
necessitated by the claims and defenses at issue in the case.252  Although 
a diligent party would certainly approach the Rule 16 conference with 
some understanding of these issues, there was generally little need to 
conduct a more thorough investigation at that stage of the proceeding. 
 
parties to delay discovery scheduling conference “until all parties can become sufficiently 
familiar with the issues arising in the action”). 
 247. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 26(f) cmt. to amendment (2011). 
 248. Id. § 1A-1, Rule 26(f)(4) (2011). 
 249. Lee & Withers, supra note 17, at 207 (finding that 71.4% of surveyed magistrate 
judges reported that the 2006 amendment to Rule 26(f) was at least somewhat effective 
in “improving the conduct of Rule 16(b) pretrial conferences,” 80.5% reported it as at 
least somewhat effective in “encourag[ing] more cooperation,” and 61.1% reported it as 
at least somewhat effective in “reduc[ing] the number of e-discovery disputes” decided by 
survey participants). 
 250. FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (2000). 
 251. Id. 
 252. See Lee & Withers, supra note 17, at 207 (finding that 71.4% of surveyed magi-
strate judges reported that the 2006 amendment to Rule 26(f) was at least somewhat ef-
fective in “improving the conduct of Rule 16(b) pretrial conferences”). 
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The demands of e-discovery, however, led the Federal Rules Com-
mittee to place a new emphasis on the “meet and confer” process with 
the goal of having the parties think about e-discovery issues early in a 
case, engage with one another on those issues, and, optimally, reach 
agreement on basic parameters for the discovery of ESI.253  This ap-
proach of promoting cooperation as a means of addressing the burdens 
of e-discovery has worked exceedingly well,254 in large part because 
every party involved in litigation in which a large volume of ESI may 
come into play has a strong incentive to narrow the scope of discovery as 
much as possible.255  Even in asymmetric litigation, parties with fewer 
resources benefit when the wheat is separated from the chaff in e-
discovery, thereby eliminating—or at least reducing—the need to man-
age large quantities of documents that, though responsive to discovery, 
do nothing to move their cases forward.256 
Since the 2006 Amendments took effect, the federal courts have 
seen a significant increase in the number of litigants reaching coopera-
tive agreements on such e-discovery related issues as the scope of the 
 
 253. 2005 COMM. REPORT, supra note 13, at 26–27; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (Advi-
sory Committee’s note on the 2006 amendments). 
 254. See Lee & Withers, supra note 17, at 207. 
 255. See Bennett B. Borden et al., Four Years Later: How the 2006 Amendments to the 
Federal Rules Have Reshaped the E-Discovery Landscape and are Revitalizing the Civil Jus-
tice System, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, 17 (2011) [hereinafter Four Years Later]. The au-
thors stated that 
Much of the consternation surrounding electronic discovery has resulted from 
the fact that parties adopting bareknuckled approaches to discovery in the age 
of ESI have driven the cost of litigation beyond all reasonable bounds.  Parties 
who approach electronic discovery in this fashion often find themselves facing 
legal discovery bills that exceed the underlying amount in controversy and 
come to dominate the litigation. 
Id.  See also Lisa M. Arent, Robert D. Brownstone & William A. Fenwick, EDiscovery: 
Preserving, Requesting & Producing Electronic Information, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 131, 178 (2002) (“Reciprocity can act as a check on unreasonable and 
premature requests for intensive electronic discovery.  When the parties are both busi-
nesses and/or the electronic discovery burdens weigh similarly on each side, there is an 
element of mutually assured destruction.”). 
 256. See Chevron Corp. v. E-Tech Int’l, No. 10cv1146-IEG (WMc), 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 53812, at *2–3 (S.D. Cal. May 19, 2011) (discussing court’s use of an e-discovery 
protocol to narrow scope of forensic examination); D’Onofrio v. SFX Sports Grp., Inc., 
256 F.R.D. 277, 280 (D.D.C. 2009) (limiting scope of forensic search and noting that 
sometimes “[a] judge must simply draw a reasonable line between the likely and the un-
likely, the discoverable and the prohibited, the wheat and the chaff”). 
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duty to preserve ESI,257 the protocol that the parties will use to search for 
relevant ESI,258 and the format in which the parties will produce ESI.259  
The benefits of such cooperation are manifest: by reaching agreement on 
these issues, litigants are able to reduce—or eliminate—the likelihood 
of disputes that were far more prevalent a decade ago when such issues 
often went unaddressed.260  When surveyed about the effectiveness of 
this new process, a clear majority of United States Magistrate Judges re-
ported that the revisions to Rule 26(f) had increased the effectiveness of 
the pre-trial “meet and confer,” promoted greater cooperation between 
the parties, and reduced the number of discovery disputes in their 
courts.261 
To a significant extent, the federal judiciary has driven this shift 
toward cooperation.  Even as litigants clung tightly to discovery norms 
or attempted to use the new rules as an adversarial tool,262 the federal 
courts whole-heartedly embraced the view that adversarial conduct is 
not compatible with the realities of e-discovery, and that litigants have a 
paramount responsibility to cooperate in discovery.  For example, Magi-
strate Judge Paul Grimm of the District of Maryland recently declined to 
rule directly on a motion to compel production of ESI and, instead, or-
 
 257. See, e.g., United States v. La. Generating, LLC, No. 09-100-RET-CN, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 20207, at *2–11 (M.D. La. Mar. 5, 2010). 
 258. See, e.g., Northington v. H&M Int’l, No. 08-CV-6297, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
14366, at *10–11 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2011). 
 259. See, e.g., Premier Int’l Assocs., LLC v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. 2-05CV-
506TJW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97541, at *15 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 11, 2007). 
 260. See Wyeth v. Impax Labs., Inc., 248 F.R.D. 169, 171 (D. Del. 2006) (considering 
motion to compel production of database in case in which “the parties . . . never agreed 
that electronic documents would be produced in any particular format”).  But see Diesel 
Mach., Inc. v. Manitowoc Crane Grp., No. CIV 09-4087-RAL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
15780, at *2–11 (D.S.D. Feb. 16, 2011) (denying motion to compel party to produce ESI 
in native format in accordance with agreement between parties where party had already 
produced ESI in PDF format). 
 261. Lee & Withers, supra note 17, at 207 (finding that 71.4% of surveyed magistrate 
judges reported that the 2006 amendment to Rule 26(f) was at least somewhat effective 
in “improving the conduct of Rule 16(b) pretrial conferences,” 80.5% reported it as at 
least somewhat effective in “encourage[ing] more cooperation,” and 61.1% reported it as 
at least somewhat effective in “reduc[ing] the number of e-discovery disputes” decided by 
survey participants). 
 262. Steven S. Gensler, Some Thoughts on the Lawyer’s E-volving Duties in Discovery, 36 
N. KY. L. REV. 521, 553 (2009) (discussing the view of one lawyer-commentator that “the 
time and expense needed to prepare for the post-2006 Rule 26(f) conference [are justi-
fied] on the grounds that doing so will provide ‘ammunition to constrain demands made 
by the other side’”). 
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dered the parties to seek a cooperative solution to the dispute.263  In a 
similar vein, Magistrate Judge Craig Shaffer of the District of Colorado 
ordered parties to seek cooperative resolutions to their disagreements 
“consistent with well-established case law and the principles underlying 
The Cooperation Proclamation.”264  The Middle District of North Carolina 
has gone so far as to adopt a local rule specifically requiring counsel “to 
cooperate and be courteous with each other in all phases of the discov-
ery process.”265  
This judicial embrace of cooperation is not surprising given the ju-
diciary’s general disdain of discovery disputes266 and the efficiencies rea-
lized from avoiding disputes as trivial as whether information should be 
produced in one electronic format over another.267  However, parties also 
benefit by embracing cooperative behavior.  In recent years, courts have 
shown increasing favor towards parties who—when confronted with a 
discovery dispute—offer cooperative, constructive, and reasonable solu-
tions.  For example, a party who offered a phased ESI protocol that 
would initially cover three custodians over a three year period prevailed 
in a dispute over the opposing party who sought a protocol that would 
cover forty custodians over a six year period.268  Another court granted 
the defendant’s motion to compel the opposing parties to use an outside 
vendor to assist with their collection, review, and production of ESI in 
part because the defendant offered to split the cost of the vendor in order 
to accelerate the pace of discovery even though it was under no duty to 
do so.269  
These cases represent a growing trend of parties obtaining a nar-
rower overall scope of e-discovery simply by adopting a cooperative ap-
 
 263. Anderson v. Reliance Standard. Life Ins. Co., No. WDQ-11-1188, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 117058, at *2 (D. Md. Oct. 11, 2011). 
 264. Cartel Asset Mgmt. v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 01-cv-01644-REB-CBS, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 17857, at *41 (D. Colo. Feb. 8, 2010). 
 265. M.D.N.C. LR 26.1(b)(1); see also EEOC v. Dolgencorp, LLC, No. 1:09CV700, 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35195, at *32 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2011) (“[T]his Court’s Local 
Rule 26.1(b)(1) . . . require[s] attorneys to conduct discovery in a cooperative fashion.”). 
 266. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3Tunes, LLC, 261 F.R.D. 44, 50 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (criticizing the parties for having drafted “dueling epistles for submission to the 
Court” rather than “focus[ing] their attention on discussing their differences”). 
 267. See, e.g., Silicon Labs Integration, Inc. v. Melman, No. C08-04030 RMW (HRL), 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122871, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2010) (“Plaintiff represents to 
this court that defendant's documents have been produced in PDF format, not TIFF.”). 
 268. Barrera v. Boughton, No. 3:07cv1436(RNC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103491 at 
*8–12 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2010). 
 269. Multiven, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 5:08-cv-05391 JW (HRL), 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 71221, at *5–6 (N.D. Cal. July. 9, 2010). 
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proach.  When such parties opt for a more adversarial stance, the court 
confronts a much starker dispute in which it must decide between allow-
ing the requesting party everything it requests, nothing it requests, or 
something in between that the court is left to craft on its own.270  By ap-
proaching discovery in a more cooperative fashion, parties are able to 
gain greater control over disputes that arise and, thereby, narrow the 
scope of ESI that they must collect, process, search, review, and pro-
duce.271  The end result of this cooperative approach is lower costs and a 
more efficient discovery process.272  
As the federal court experience has shown, promoting cooperation 
is a powerful method of mitigating the burdens of e-discovery.  Through 
the combination of the 2006 Amendments, the support of the judiciary, 
and the recognition by counsel of the associated benefits, this paradig-
matic shift has already substantially impacted many notions long-held by 
attorneys of how discovery should be conducted.273  This shift, however, 
remains a work in progress given the number of ESI-related disputes that 
continue to come before the federal courts as a result of adversarial con-
duct on the part of one or both parties.274 
With the advent of the new “meet and confer” process, H.B. 380 sets 
North Carolina on a similar path as the federal courts.  By promoting 
engagement between the parties with the goal of crafting a cooperative 
plan for discovery, Rule 26(f) now fosters the same type of collaborative 
 
 270. DeGeer v. Gillis, 755 F. Supp. 2d 909, 929 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (noting that neither 
party had “approached production of . . . ESI with a spirit of cooperation and efficiency,” 
but conditionally granting defendants’ motion to compel, and admonishing the parties to 
cooperate prospectively). 
 271. The Sedona Conference, The Case for Cooperation, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 339, 342 
(2009), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/tsc_cooperation_ 
proclamation/caseforcooperation.pdf (suggesting that a cooperative approach “allows the 
parties to save money, maintain greater control over the dispersal of information, main-
tain goodwill with courts, and address the litigation’s merits at the earliest practicable 
time”). 
 272. Id. 
 273. See, e.g., Hausfeld LLP and Milberg LLP, E-Discovery Today: The Fault Lies Not In 
Our Rules . . ., 2011 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 35 (2011) (stating that “enhanced cooperation 
among parties . . . is the most powerful tool available to reduce the costs and burdens of 
e-discovery” and that “[t]hose who hold fast to the outdated notion that adversarial dis-
covery is the only way to litigate are clinging to the railing of a sinking ship”). 
 274. See, e.g., Accounting Principals, Inc. v. Solomon Edwards Grp., LLC, No. 09-
2085-CM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82071, at *4 (D. Kan. Aug. 12, 2010)  (characterizing 
the discovery dispute at issue as “the litigation equivalent of the cafeteria food fight scene 
in the infamous movie Animal House” before ordering a conference to discuss salient is-
sues). 
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environment in state court discovery that the 2006 Amendments fos-
tered in the federal courts, although arguably to a slightly lesser degree 
given that the “meet and confer” is not mandatory in all state court cas-
es.275  Nevertheless, by setting the stage for engagement and cooperation, 
there is every reason to believe that North Carolina will experience the 
same type of cooperative shift as the federal courts, particularly given the 
strong incentive that parties have to collaborate in order to obtain the 
benefits that flow from a discovery scheduling order.276 
It is significant to note that this new procedure and the cooperative 
possibilities that it creates could not have come at a better time for the 
state court system in North Carolina.  Between state-level budget cuts,277 
and significant caseloads,278 the resources of the State courts have been 
stretched increasingly thin in recent years.  By aggressively promoting a 
more cooperative approach to discovery, State court judges can—as the 
federal judiciary has done—reduce the number and intensity of the dis-
covery disputes that they confront and thereby conserve the resources 
that they would otherwise have to allocate to the management of such 
disputes.  Indeed, litigants in federal court now routinely reach coopera-
tive agreements on basic discovery-related issues that, as recently as a 
decade ago, generated full-blown discovery disputes 279 and have begun 
 
 275. E-DISCOVERY COMM. REPORT, supra note 19, at 1. 
 276. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 26(f) (2011) (providing that the court may “en-
ter an order tentatively . . . establishing a plan and schedule for discovery” following a 
discovery conference wherein the parties are expected to cooperate and to establish a 
discovery plan). 
 277. See N.C. Judicial Department Voluntary Reduction-in-Force Plan, THE NORTH 
CAROLINA COURT SYSTEM, http://www.nccourts.org/News/NewsDetail.asp?id=1383&type= 
1&archive=False (last visited Jan. 15, 2012) (detailing voluntary reduction-in-force plan 
to address anticipated budget cuts). 
 278. See Phillip Bantz, State Business Court Straining Under Caseload, NORTH CAROLINA 
LAWYERS WEEKLY, July 29, 2011, available at 
http://nclawyersweekly.com/2011/07/29/state-business-courts-straining-under-caseload. 
 279. Compare Kay Beer Distrib. v. Energy Brands, Inc., No. 07-C-1068, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 130595, at *17 (E.D. Wis. June 10, 2009) (noting that “the parties had 
agreed at their Rule 26 conference that either a hard copy or electronic copy [of respon-
sive documents] would be produced depending on what was most cost-effective”), White 
v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-216, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112102, at *11 
(S.D. Ohio Dec. 31, 2008) (noting that “the parties agreed in the Rule 26(f) Report to 
produce all documents on paper”), and Hassaine v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., No. 
09CV2215-MMA (BGS), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34117, at *12 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2011) 
(noting that “the parties agreed to produce any electronic information in written for-
mat”), with Wyeth v. Impax Labs., Inc., 248 F.R.D. 169, 171 (D. Del. 2006) (considering 
motion to compel production of database in case in which “the parties . . . never agreed 
that electronic documents would be produced in any particular format”). 
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to use collaborative agreements to address issues of preservation that are 
not currently governed by the federal rules.280  
ii. H.B. 380 Will Promote Greater Proportionality in Discovery 
North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) has long incorporated 
the same proportionality principles as the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure,281 with the text of the State rule closely tracking the federal rule.282  
The North Carolina rule reads: 
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in sec-
tion (a) shall be limited by the court if it determines that:  
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is 
obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burden-
some, or less expensive;  
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery 
in the action to obtain the information sought; or  
(iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into ac-
count the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on 
the parties’ resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the lit-
igation.  
The court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or pur-
suant to a motion under section (c).283 
Regardless, North Carolina State courts have adhered to a liberal discov-
ery paradigm, rarely invoking Rule 26(b)(1) to vary a party’s discovery 
 
 280. Compare United States v. La. Generating, LLC, No. 09-100-RET-CN, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 20207, at *2–11 (M.D. La. Mar. 5, 2010) (noting stipulated preservation or-
der freeing parties of duty to preserve certain categories of information), and In re Yas-
min and Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-
02100-DRH-PMF, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14092, at *1–11 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 2010) (enter-
ing agreed-upon preservation order limiting information that plaintiffs had duty to pre-
serve in class action lawsuit), with Mini-Conference on Preservation and Sanctions, Sept. 9, 
2011, at 7, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/DallasMiniConf_ 
Materials/Notes%20from%20the%20Mini-Conference%20on%20Preservation%20and% 
20Sanctions.pdf [hereinafter Mini-Conference] (detailing discussions regarding need for 
rule changes to govern preservation). 
 281. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(1) (2009), with FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(b)(2).  See also Analog Devices, Inc. v. Michalski, 01 CVS 10614, 2006 NCBC LEXIS 
16, at *41–42 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2006) (conducting a proportionality analysis un-
der North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1)). 
 282. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(1) (2009), with FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(b)(2). 
 283. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 26(b)(1) (2009). 
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obligation.284  H.B. 380, however, breathes new life into this underuti-
lized rule by emphasizing the need for a greater balance in the discovery 
of ESI. 
The principle of proportional discovery, reflected in both the feder-
al and state versions of Rule 26(b), rests on the concept that discovery 
should be only as broad as necessary to advance the merits of a civil ac-
tion or, put differently, that no party should face discovery unless the as-
sociated burdens are justified by the value of the information to the liti-
gation.285  With the advent of ESI, the potential gulf between a discovery 
request for “all documents” on a given subject and one more narrowly 
tailored became enormous.  For example, in one North Carolina case, a 
party reduced the scope of an ESI search from 2500 to 400 backup tapes 
simply by focusing its document requests.286  The new focus on coopera-
tion in H.B. 380 will go a long way in achieving these efficiencies, but 
principles of proportional discovery serve as an important adjunct to 
limit the scope of discovery when its utility does not outweigh the bur-
dens associated with its production. 
 
 284. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Corp. v. SR Int’l Bus. Ins. Co., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17, at 
*17–18 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2006) (quashing subpoena based on proportionality 
analysis); Analog Devices, Inc., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 16, at *41–42 (declining to limit elec-
tronic discovery based on undue burden, but requiring parties to share the costs of e-
discovery); Phelps-Dickson Builders, LLC v. Amerimann Partners, 617 S.E.2d 664, 668 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Rule 26(b)(1) as part of general reference to scope of dis-
covery); Joyce v. Joyce, COA03-1314, 2004 N.C. App. LEXIS 2119, at *6 (N.C. Ct. App. 
Dec. 7, 2004) (citing Rule 26(b)(1) as part of general reference to scope of discovery); 
Lindsey v. Boddie-Noell Enters., Inc., 555 S.E.2d 369, 373 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001), rev’d on 
other grounds, 562 S.E.2d 420 (N.C. 2002) (limiting discovery because “plaintiff had am-
ple opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought” (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
 285. See, e.g., Analog Devices, Inc., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 16, at *36 (“Electronic discov-
ery burdens must be proportional to the amount in controversy and nature of the case.  
Otherwise transaction costs due to electronic discovery will overwhelm the ability to re-
solve disputes fairly in litigation.” (quoting The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Prin-
ciples: Best Practices Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Document Production 17 
(2005))); Azalea Garden Bd. & Care, Inc. v. Vanhoy, 2009 NCBC LEXIS 7, at *13 (N.C. 
Super. Ct. 2009) (stating that “discovery must be . . . proportional to what is at issue in 
the litigation”) (quoting Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 357–63 
(D. Md. 2008)). 
 286. See Response to Motion to Compel, Exhibit 2, Affidavit of Dennis Richter, Bank 
of Am. Corp., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17 (No. 05-CVS-5564), available at 
http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/TCDDotNetPublic/default.aspx?CID=3&caseNumber=0
5CVS5564; Response to Motion to Compel, Exhibit 3, Affidavit of Carl Hardel, Bank of 
Am. Corp., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17 (No. 05-CVS-5564), available at 
http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/TCDDotNetPublic/default.aspx?CID=3&caseNumber=0
5CVS5564. 
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As an initial matter, it is important to note that H.B. 380 does not 
alter, change or amend the existing proportionality principles in Rule 
26(b)(1).  The new rules, however, augment a court’s power to propor-
tion discovery by authorizing parties to modulate the scope of electronic 
discovery on the same grounds.287  Under Rules 26(b)(3) and 34(b), a 
party can resist the discovery of ESI that is “not reasonably accessible be-
cause of undue burden or cost.”288  Unlike Rule 26(b)(1), the decision of 
whether to invoke these accessibility limitations rests—at least in the 
first instance—with the party from which discovery is sought and on 
which the burden would fall.  A party can invoke these rules to object 
and narrow the scope of its discovery responses to only those documents 
or data sources that are “reasonably accessible.”289  Under Rule 26(c), a 
party can take a more proactive approach and seek a protective order to 
impose similar limits on the scope of discovery.290 
In either instance, the party’s ability to resist discovery on accessi-
bility grounds ultimately turns on the same factors that govern the 
court’s power under Rule 26(b)(1)(iii): undue burden and cost.  By tying 
the accessibility limitations to these factors, H.B. 380 functionally ex-
pands the role of proportionality when ESI is at issue.  Indeed, because 
the court is the ultimate arbiter of whether any given discovery request 
is unduly burdensome or costly, the proportionality factors in Rule 
26(b)(1)(iii) now serve as the basic guide that parties can use when 
crafting ESI requests and analyzing the proper scope of an ESI produc-
tion, given that they are the same factors that a court would use if a dis-
pute later arose.  
 
 287. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rules 26(c), 34(b) (2011).  Unlike Rule 26(b)(1), which 
only authorizes a court to proportion any form of discovery, the new authority created 
under H.B. 380 only applies to discovery involving ESI.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 
26(c) (“A party seeking a protective order on the basis that electronically stored informa-
tion sought is from a source identified as not reasonably accessible . . . .” (emphasis add-
ed)); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1 Rule 34(b) (“In addition to other bases for objection, the 
response [to a request for production of electronically stored information] may state an 
objection to production of electronically stored information from sources that the party 
identified as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.” (emphasis add-
ed)). 
 288. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rules 26(b)(3), 34(b). 
 289. See Bank of Am. Corp., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *42 (quoting CONF. OF CHIEF 
JUSTICES, supra note 12). 
 290. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 26(c) (“Upon motion by a party or by the per-
son from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the judge of the court in 
which the action is pending may make any order which justice requires to protect a party 
or person from . . . undue burden or expense . . . .”). 
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In two decisions that pre-date H.B. 380, the North Carolina Busi-
ness Court demonstrated the power and flexibility of these proportional-
ity principles.291  Significantly, but perhaps not surprisingly, in both 
Bank of America Corp. v. SR International Business Insurance Co. and Ana-
log Devices, Inc. v. Michalski, Judge Ben Tennille used a proportionality 
analysis to resolve disputes over the scope of e-discovery.292  In Bank of 
America Corp., Judge Tennille considered a defendant’s motion to com-
pel compliance with a Rule 45 subpoena that would have required a 
non-party to search for and produce ESI that was spread across up to 
2500 backup tapes located in Charlotte, New York, London, and Bermu-
da at an estimated cost of over $1.5 million.293  In Analog Devices, Inc., 
the court considered a motion to compel production of ESI that was con-
tained on approximately 400 backup tapes and was estimated to cost at 
least $54,000.294  In each case, Judge Tennille resolved the dispute by 
conducting a subjective analysis of whether the value of the information 
sought outweighed the circumstances surrounding the claims of undue 
burden.295 
In Bank of America Corp., Judge Tennille found that the exigencies 
involved were paramount based on: 
(1) the size of the expense and the burden of production placed upon a 
nonparty, (2) the breadth of the information sought, (3) the availability 
of information from other sources, (4) the fact that the information 
sought was on inaccessible backup tapes, (5) the absence of any unwar-
ranted or suspicious destruction of information, and (6) the low level of 
marginal utility shown at this stage of the proceedings.296 
In Analog Devices, Inc., Judge Tennille conducted a similar analysis 
before narrowing the dispositive issues down to cost and relevance, and 
ultimately concluding that “[t]he uncertainty of the cost combined with 
 
 291. See generally Bank of Am. Corp., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17; Analog Devices, Inc., 2006 
NCBC LEXIS 16. 
 292. Bank of Am. Corp., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *32; Analog Devices, Inc., 2006 
NCBC LEXIS 16, at *39–45. 
 293. See Response to Motion to Compel, Exhibit 2, Affidavit of Dennis Richter, Bank 
of Am. Corp., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17 (No. 05-CVS-5564), available at 
http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/TCDDotNetPublic/default.aspx?CID=3&caseNumber=0
5CVS5564; Response to Motion to Compel, Exhibit 3, Affidavit of Carl Hardel, Bank of 
Am. Corp., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17 (No. 05-CVS-5564), available at 
http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/TCDDotNetPublic/default.aspx?CID=3&caseNumber=0
5CVS5564. 
 294. Analog Devices, Inc., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 16, at *40–41. 
 295. Bank of Am. Corp., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *17–18; Analog Devices, Inc., 2006 
NCBC LEXIS 16, at *39–45. 
 296. Bank of Am. Corp., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *17–18. 
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the potential probative value of the discovery [wa]s too great to deny” 
production of the ESI.297  Judge Tennille further concluded, however, 
that the level of uncertainty in his analysis justified cost-shifting and 
therefore ordered the parties to share the cost of restoring the backup 
tapes.298 
Both of these opinions are less important for the conclusions that 
Judge Tennille reached than the process that he used to reach them.  In 
each case, Judge Tennille asked whether the exigent circumstances sur-
rounding discovery in the case (i.e., the parties’ resources, the cost of 
discovery, the value of the information, etc.) outweighed North Caroli-
na’s presumptive policy of liberal discovery.299  Although courts had pre-
viously used Rule 26(b)(1) to limit discovery (even if only sparingly),300 
Bank of America Corp. and Analog Devices, Inc. represent some of the first 
instances—if not the first instance301—of a State court fully exercising 
its authority to determine whether to prevent discovery based on a sub-
jective analysis of factors that, with the exception of potential probative 
value, were disconnected from the merits of the action. 
With its expansion of proportionality in discovery, H.B. 380 again 
lays the groundwork for a fundamental change in how both litigants and 
courts in the State approach discovery.  The concept that discovery 
should be only as broad as necessary to advance the merits of an ac-
tion—and that a party should have the power to make this decision in 
the first instance—is largely anathema to the liberal discovery tradition 
 
 297. Analog Devices, Inc., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 16, at *45. 
 298. Id.  Judge Tennille also reserved the issue of whether to order further cost shift-
ing until later in the matter.  Id. at *11. 
 299. Bank of Am. Corp., 2006 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *17–18; Analog Devices, Inc., 2006 
NCBC 16, at *45. 
 300. Lindsey v. Boddie-Noell Enters., Inc., 555 S.E.2d 369, 373 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001), 
rev’d on other grounds, 562 S.E.2d 420 (N.C. 2002) (limiting discovery because “plaintiff 
had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought”) (in-
ternal quotations omitted). 
 301. North Carolina Superior and District Courts continue overwhelmingly to main-
tain court records in paper form and do not maintain any type of centralized repository 
that can be readily searched to identify court orders that address any given issue or topic.  
Lacking the resources necessary to conduct a thorough search of these paper court files 
spread across the 100 counties of the State, the authors have been unable to determine 
whether any trial courts other than the North Carolina Business Court have actively em-
ployed a proportionality analysis under Rule 26(b)(1).  However, the authors have been 
unable to identify any such case in which a discovery issue resolved in that manner by 
the trial court has reached the Court of Appeals, with the possible exception of the per-
functory use of Rule 26(b)(1)(ii) in Lindsey v. Boddie-Noell Enterprises.  See id. 
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to which North Carolina has long adhered.302  However, in an environ-
ment where a traditional request for “all documents” on a given subject 
can generate expenses as high as $70 million,303 the realities of electronic 
discovery necessitate a change in this tradition.  If courts actively pro-
mote and parties actively apply these proportionality principles, North 
Carolina will realize a discovery process that is more streamlined, effi-
cient, and focused on the merits of the dispute, rather than collateral 
discovery issues.304 
IV. PRACTICAL TOOLS TO INCREASE EFFICIENCY OF ELECTRONIC 
DISCOVERY 
As the process of discovering ESI has matured, attorneys, courts 
and service providers—particularly those engaged in federal litigation—
have developed a number of tools and techniques to address and sur-
mount the challenges associated with the discovery of large quantities of 
ESI.  In various ways, these tools and techniques seek either to constrain 
the volume of ESI that goes fully through discovery or to streamline the 
process through which that data passes.  Although not exhaustive, the 
following list represents a core group of tools that practitioners and their 
clients can use—when appropriate—to manage some of the common 
challenges that arise in this area. 
  
• Phased Discovery Protocols 
 
Phased discovery is a technique that controls the volume of ESI 
subject to discovery at any one time and creates circumstances under 
which the e-discovery process may terminate before reaching certain re-
positories of ESI.  Whether implemented by agreement or court order, a 
phased protocol segments the discovery process into a series of constitu-
ent elements in order to search for and reveal the most relevant informa-
tion early in the discovery process.305  For example, a protocol might di-
vide an undifferentiated mass of ESI into specific groups of custodians, 
 
 302. See In re Estate of Johnson, 697 S.E.2d 365, 366 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (noting 
that trial court had ordered party to “provide full and complete answers and responses to 
[opposing party’s] First and Second Discovery, without objection” (emphasis added)). 
 303. See Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 557–58 (W.D. 
Tenn. 2003) (estimating privilege review costs of “between $16.5 million and $70 mil-
lion” (internal citations omitted)). 
 304. See generally Four Years Later, supra note 255. 
 305. Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 365 (D. Md. 2008). 
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designated periods of time, certain geographic areas, or any other catego-
rizing principle that will group the ESI at issue into logical groups for 
recovery and searching.306 
Once the grouping is complete, the parties conduct discovery on 
the constituent ESI elements in accordance with a predetermined set of 
rules.307  Often, a protocol will set out specific triggers that prevent dis-
covery from proceeding to a subsequent phase unless the information 
produced in the current phase satisfies a certain threshold.308  One im-
portant benefit of conducting discovery in this segmented manner is that 
parties can deal with ESI in more manageable chunks at a lower margin-
al cost and avoid the cost of discovery of certain groups of ESI altogether 
if the information produced in the early phases leads to resolution or 
demonstrates the futility of proceeding to later phases.  
 
• Computer-Assisted Non-Linear Document Review 
 
The enormous expenses associated with high-volume e-discovery 
are often a result of a party’s pre-production review of the ESI that it has 
previously identified, collected, processed, and searched.  The costs as-
sociated with the collection of ESI can be significant, but rarely reach 
stratospheric levels.309  In comparison, the costs associated with a tradi-
tional “eyes-on” linear ESI review in which each page of each document 
is reviewed by at least one attorney can reach breathtaking heights.  For 
 
 306. See, e.g., Barrera v. Boughton, No. 3:07cv1436(RNC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
103491, at *12 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2010) (ordering phased search of ESI to begin with 
three of the forty custodians requested by party seeking discovery); Makrakis v. DeMelis, 
No. 09-706-C, 2010 Mass. Super. LEXIS 223, at *6–7 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 13, 2010) 
(ordering initial sampling of ESI from thirteen custodians to determine whether broader 
search was justified). 
 307. See, e.g., Tamburo v. Dworkin, No. 04 C 3317, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121510, at 
*11 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2010) (ordering parties to prepare phased discovery protocol and 
directing that “parties should identify which claims are most likely to go forward and 
concentrate their discovery efforts in that direction before moving on to other claims”). 
 308. Vondriska v. Gerald Cugno & Paychex Bus. Solutions, Inc., No. 8:07-cv-1322-T-
24-TGW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92742, at *2–3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2010) (describing 
phased discovery process under which parties were unable to conduct discovery on me-
rits of plaintiff’s claim prior to resolution of threshold issue under Fair Labor Standards 
Act). 
 309. See Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. The William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 425–
26 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (detailing estimates of up to $84,000 for one party and $395,000 for 
another party to collect and produce ESI).  But see id. at 425 (detailing estimate of nearly 
$10 million to select, catalogue, restore, and process all emails sought from one party 
involved in lawsuit). 
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example, in one matter, the cost of restoring, de-duping, and searching 
ESI was approximately $600,000, which, although not a trivial sum, 
paled in comparison to the $16.5 million to $70 million estimate for the 
pre-production review of the ESI.310 
In recent years, new technologies have emerged that dramatically 
reduce the cost of review by employing advanced search and machine 
learning technologies to group and code documents in a non-linear fa-
shion.311  These technologies save costs by obviating the need for an at-
torney or multiple attorneys to review mechanically every single page of 
every single document.312  Attorneys remain directly involved in this 
process, but these technologies streamline the review process by using 
various algorithms to classify documents by analyzing various characte-
ristics of the constituent data.313 
Although a full exploration of computer-assisted review is beyond 
the scope of this Article, the efficiencies that they are capable of deliver-
ing are manifest.  In one comparison, a computer-assisted non-linear re-
view of over 20,000 documents was completed in one-tenth of the time 
that it took for a traditional “eyes-on” linear review of the same set of 
documents.314  Perhaps more importantly, not only was the computer-
assisted review significantly faster, the process was more accurate at 
identifying and coding documents in a consistent manner than the tradi-
tional review process.315  Similar studies have produced similar results,316 
demonstrating the power of these emerging technologies to increase 
substantially the efficiency of e-discovery. 
 
 
 
 310. See Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 557–58 (W.D. 
Tenn. 2003). 
 311. See generally Bennett B. Borden et al., Why Document Review Is Broken, EDIG: E-
DISCOVERY & INFORMATION GOVERNANCE, (Williams Mullen, Richmond, VA.), May 2011 
[hereinafter Why Document Review is Broken], available at 
http://www.umiacs.umd.edu/~oard/desi4/papers/borden.pdf (discussing computer-
assisted non-linear review); The Demise of Linear Review, supra note 8. 
 312. See generally Why Document Review Is Broken, supra note 311. 
 313. The Demise of Linear Review, supra note 8, at 2–3. 
 314. Why Document Review Is Broken, supra note 311, at 2–3. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack, Technology-Assisted Review in E-
Discovery Can Be More Effective and More Efficient Than Exhaustive Manual Review, 17 
RICH J.L. & TECH. 11, 11 (2011) (“[T]echnology-assisted review processes . . . achieve[d] 
results superior to those that could have been achieved through a manual review of [the 
same] document collection . . . .”). 
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• Preservation Agreements 
 
The preservation of ESI once litigation begins or is reasonably antic-
ipated remains one of the most challenging aspects of electronic discov-
ery.  With the risk of spoliation ever present,317 and the potentially cata-
strophic nature of related sanctions,318 parties continue to struggle with 
the logistics and costs associated with simply ensuring that they do not 
inadvertently lose or destroy information once the preservation obliga-
tion is triggered.319  In recent years, judges, practitioners and academics 
have devoted a substantial amount of time to discussing whether further 
rules are needed to define more clearly the duty to preserve.320  While 
that debate has continued, courts and practitioners have sought to ad-
dress this issue within the context of the current rules through stipu-
lated preservation agreements and orders that specifically define what 
parties must and—often more importantly—need not preserve.  Such 
agreements are beneficial because they not only provide parties with 
clear direction on their preservation obligation, but they create a zone of 
safety in which parties can free ESI from the burden of a litigation hold 
without the fear of later facing a spoliation motion.321 
 
• Privilege Agreements 
 
The fear of losing the protections afforded by the attorney-client 
privilege and work-product doctrine through waiver resulting from an 
inadvertent disclosure of protected material is one of the primary rea-
sons that review costs can mount so quickly when a large volume of ESI 
 
 317. See Mini-Conference, supra note 280, at 7. 
 318.  See Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp. v. BC Tech., 773 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1216 (D. 
Utah 2010) (recommending default sanction against party for failure to preserve ESI). 
 319. See Mini-Conference, supra note 280, at 2. 
 320. See id. (detailing discussions regarding the need for rule changes to govern pre-
servation). 
 321. See, e.g., United States v. La. Generating, LLC, No. 09-100-RET-CN, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 20207, at *2–11 (M.D. La. Mar. 5, 2010) (discussing a stipulated preserva-
tion order excluding eleven categories of data, including deleted computer files, from the 
duty to preserve); In re: Yasmin and Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. 
Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14092, at *1–11 (S.D. 
Ill. Feb. 10, 2010) (noting a preservation order limiting the categories of documents and 
data that plaintiffs in a class action have a duty to preserve). 
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is subjected to the discovery process.322  The 2006 Amendments323 and 
H.B. 380324 provide a base level of protection in an advertent disclosure 
situation, but the danger of waiver nonetheless remains.325  Parties can 
further reduce this risk, however, by entering a non-waiver agreement 
and/or moving the court to enter a non-waiver order.326 
Under a “non-waiver agreement,” parties agree that, under certain 
circumstances, the production of privileged ESI during discovery does 
not waive any privilege that attaches thereto.327  Such agreements typi-
cally set out a specific process that the parties agree to use to manage the 
production of ESI and strengthen the protection of privilege within the 
context of this process.328  For example, under so-called “quick peek” 
 
 322. See Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. The William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 426 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (discussing estimated cost of pre-production privilege review of re-
quested ESI). 
 323. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(5)(B).  Additionally, revisions made to Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 502 in 2008 strengthened the protection of privilege in federal court proceedings.  
See FED. R. EVID. 502. 
 324. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, RULE 26(b)(7)(B) (2011). 
 325. Rhoads Indus. v. Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am., 254 F.R.D. 216, 226–27 (E.D. Pa. 
2008) (analyzing whether inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents resulted in 
waiver under FED. R. CIV. P. 26 and FED. R. EVID. 502). 
 326. See Hopson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 234–35 (D. 
Md. 2005) (discussing “non-waiver agreements”). 
 327. See, e.g., Gruss v. Zwirn, No. 09 Civ. 6441 (PGG) (MHD), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
79298, at *73–75 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2011) (holding that party had not waived privilege 
status of documents that were produced to government agency pursuant to non-waiver 
agreement). 
 328. The notes of the advisory committee regarding the 2006 Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are illuminative on this point: 
Parties may attempt to minimize . . . costs and delays by agreeing to protocols 
that minimize the risk of waiver.  They may agree that the responding party 
will provide certain requested materials for initial examination without waiving 
any privilege or protection—sometimes known as a ‘quick peek.’  The request-
ing party then designates the documents it wishes to have actually produced. 
This designation is the Rule 34 request.  The responding party then responds in 
the usual course, screening only those documents actually requested for formal 
production and asserting privilege claims as provided in Rule 26(b)(5)(A).  On 
other occasions, parties enter agreements—sometimes called ‘clawback agree-
ments’—that production without intent to waive privilege or protection should 
not be a waiver so long as the responding party identifies the documents mista-
kenly produced, and that the documents should be returned under those cir-
cumstances.  Other voluntary arrangements may be appropriate depending on 
the circumstances of each litigation.  In most circumstances, a party who rece-
ives information under such an arrangement cannot assert that production of 
the information waived a claim of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation 
material. 
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agreements, (1) the producing party makes the requested ESI available 
for review without first conducting a full-fledged privilege review; (2) 
the requesting party then reviews that ESI and designates the relevant 
documents that it wants produced; and (3) the producing party then re-
views those designated documents for privilege.329  Under such agree-
ments, the parties explicitly agree that any disclosure of privileged ma-
terial during the requesting party’s first-pass review of the ESI does not 
waive any privilege that may attach to that ESI.330  Similarly, so-called 
“claw back” agreements operate by allowing a party to produce requested 
ESI without first conducting a full-fledged privilege review and then lat-
er recover any privileged documents that it produced with such disclo-
sure triggering waiver.331 
By rearranging certain aspects of the traditional discovery timeline 
or instituting other protections, “non-waiver agreements” allow parties to 
proceed with discovery without first conducting an exhaustive privilege 
review and with a significantly reduced fear of any inadvertent disclo-
sure resulting in a privilege waiver.  These agreements, however, are not 
without limitations.332  Because they are essentially contracts between 
parties involved in the litigation, “non-waiver agreements” do not bind 
non-parties to the litigation and, thus, any further disclosure of privi-
leged information to such parties revives the waiver threat.333  Parties can 
mitigate such danger by having the court approve and adopt the non-
waiver agreement in a court order.334  Furthermore, even when a non-
 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (Advisory Committee’s note on 2006 amendments). 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. 
 331. It has been held that: 
many parties to document-intensive litigation enter into so-called ‘claw-back’ 
agreements that allow the parties to forego privilege review altogether in favor 
of an agreement to return inadvertently produced privileged documents. The 
parties here can still reach such an agreement with respect to the remaining se-
venty-two tapes and thereby avoid any cost of reviewing these tapes for privi-
lege. 
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 332. See Hopson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 244 (D. Md. 
2005) (discussing danger of waiver even where parties enter “non-waiver agreement”). 
 333. See FED. R. EVID 502(e) (“An agreement on the effect of disclosure in a federal 
proceeding [of a privileged document] is binding only on the parties to the agreement, 
unless it is incorporated into a court order.”). 
 334. See id. 
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waiver agreement or order is in place, a party should still take reasonable 
measures to protect the privilege.335 
 
• Information Governance Review 
 
Each of the foregoing cost-reduction tools only applies after litiga-
tion begins.  Prior to such point in time, the most powerful tool that a 
company can use to reduce its exposure to e-discovery costs is effective 
management of its ESI.  Although a party can control cost by limiting the 
scope of e-discovery or streamlining the production of ESI, the most ef-
fective way to reduce costs is to reduce the volume of ESI that could be 
subjected to discovery.  Because we can now store enormous quantities 
of electronic information at low cost with a small physical footprint, we, 
as a society, have developed a tendency of retaining far more information 
than we actually need or use.336  As a result, a substantial portion of e-
discovery cost is incurred wading through information that has no func-
tional purpose or value either inside or outside of the litigation. 
A company can eliminate the e-discovery risks associated with the 
accumulation of valueless ESI by conducting a pre-litigation information 
governance review to identify what ESI it is creating and storing, what 
the ESI contains, where the ESI is stored, why it is storing the ESI (i.e., 
for regulatory, business, or other reasons), and what function that ESI 
serves for its business.  By using the results of such a review to craft a 
comprehensive information governance plan that eliminates existing re-
positories of ESI that have no functional value, and prevents such reposi-
tories from forming in the future, companies can substantially reduce 
the risk of runaway e-discovery costs once litigation begins.  An informa-
tion governance review of this type also allows companies to craft and 
implement a litigation response protocol to ensure full compliance with 
their preservation obligations and, thereby, reduce the threat of spolia-
tion. 
 
 335. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 502 (Advisory Committee’s note) (“[A] party that uses ad-
vanced analytical software applications and linguistic tools in screening for privilege and 
work product may be found to have taken ‘reasonable steps’ to prevent inadvertent dis-
closure. The implementation of an efficient system of records management before litiga-
tion may also be relevant.”). 
 336. See Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 
No. 05 Civ. 9016 (SAS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4546, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010) (not-
ing that we live in “an era where vast amounts of electronic information [are] available”); 
Maria Perez Crist, Preserving the Duty to Preserve: The Increasing Vulnerability of Electron-
ic Information, 58 S.C. L. REV. 7, 9 (2006) (stating that “improvements in technology 
make information storage easier and cheaper in an electronic form”). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
State court litigation in North Carolina is far too diverse and varied 
for H.B. 380 to have a uniform effect across every type of case regardless 
of subject matter.  However, as the experience of the federal courts fol-
lowing adoption of the 2006 Amendments demonstrates, the rules-based 
framework that the E-Discovery Committee proposed and the North 
Carolina General Assembly passed to govern electronic discovery lays 
the groundwork for a fundamental shift in the State court discovery 
process away from the traditional adversarial paradigm and towards a 
more cooperative and proportional future. 
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